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CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT 
TIMOTHY ZICK∗ 
This Article examines the intersection between territory and 
constitutional liberty. Territoriality, as defined by Robert Sack, is the 
attempt to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and 
relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. 
Territoriality affects constitutional liberty in profound ways. These effects 
have been apparent in certain infamous historical episodes, including the 
territoriality of racial segregation, the geographic exclusion and 
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, early state 
migratory exclusions, and isolation of the sick and mentally ill. Today, 
governments are resorting to territorial restrictions in an increasing 
number of circumstances, including detention of enemy combatants at 
Guantanamo Bay, attempted expulsion of illegal immigrants from local 
communities, banishment of convicted sex offenders from vast geographic 
areas, exclusion of homeless persons from public spaces, and proposed 
isolation and quarantine of victims of pandemics and bio-terrorist attacks. 
These and other measures have produced what the Article refers to as 
Geographies of Justice, Membership, Punishment, Purification, and 
Contagion. Within these geographies, persons and groups are subject to 
constitutional displacement—the territorial restriction or denial of 
fundamental liberties. The displacements examined in the Article 
substantially restrict or deny basic liberties including access to justice, 
migration, movement, communal and political membership, and the ability 
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to be present in places of one’s own choosing. The Article demonstrates 
that the Constitution provides less than robust protection from certain 
forms of territorial displacement. Analyzing the Constitution itself as a 
spatial framework, one that relies upon place, geography, and territory for 
various purposes, the Article shows that displacement arises from extra-
territorial and intra-territorial “spatial gaps” in text and structure. The 
Article proposes that these spatial gaps be narrowed or closed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In ways not always fully appreciated, constitutional liberty and 
spatiality are inextricably linked. The geography of cyberspace does not 
currently permit much in the way of official spatial regulation.1 On firmer 
ground, however, spatiality remains a powerful regulatory tool. 
Geographic and territorial borders determine membership in polities, such 
that mere physical presence within a territory gives rise to certain rights 
and privileges. Expulsion or removal extinguishes these claims. Spatial 
restrictions on ingress or egress affect locomotion, mobility, and 
migration. Restrictions on the places or territories in which a person may 
reside, work, or recreate affect fundamental interests in choice of 
community, pursuit of livelihood, and the basic dignity associated with 
freedom of movement. Spatial restrictions also affect liberties we do not 
routinely associate with place or geography, including access to judicial 
process, equality, and rights of association and expression.2 In many 
respects, there is no more fundamental liberty than the freedom to choose 
one’s own place.3 The loss of that freedom can result in severe forms of 
not only personal, but constitutional, displacement.  
Spatiality is a useful, necessary, and often legitimate organizing and 
constituting principle. Governments rely upon borders and boundaries in 
carrying out a host of ordinary functions, including defense of sovereignty, 
distribution of privileges and benefits, and maintenance of public order.4 
But as we shall see, governmental control over and manipulation of place, 
geography, and territory can be very dangerous to individual liberty.5  
 
 
 1. That does not mean, however, that cyberspace is not subject to substantial private ordering. 
Dan Hunter, Cyberspace As Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 
(2003). 
 2. See generally Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581 (2006) 
(examining relationship between spatial regulations and First Amendment liberties); Timothy Zick, 
Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439 (2006) 
(discussing expressive aspects of place) [hereinafter Zick, Space, Place, and Speech]. 
 3. The social justice effects of geography and territory are examined in DAVID M. SMITH, 
GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1994). On territory and its relationship to membership, see 
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 5. Sometimes the danger is not immediately apparent. For example, the Los Angeles Police 
Department recently unveiled a plan to geographically map Muslim communities within the city to 
purportedly combat radicalization in religious enclaves. The plan raised serious equal protection and 
religious free exercise concerns. More disturbingly, in the event of a terrorist threat or other 
emergency, such mapping might also have been used to restrict community members’ liberty of 
movement. See Neil MacFarquhar, Protest Greets Police Plan to Map Muslim Angelenos, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2007, at A23. After sustained public outcry, officials decided to scrap the plan. Associated 
Press, California: Police Shelve Muslim Mapping Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A24. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The geographer Robert Sack refers to the strategic use of space as 
territoriality, which he defines as “the attempt by an individual or group to 
affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by 
delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.”6 Working from 
that basic definition, this Article examines the intersection of territoriality 
and liberty, and the effect of that intersection on certain persons and 
groups—namely, war on terrorism detainees, undocumented and other 
immigrants, released sex offenders, the destitute and homeless, and those 
who are either afflicted with a contagious disease or believed to be so. 
These illustrative examples will show how governments use territory to 
map and enforce distinct legal geographies, both within and outside the 
territorial boundaries of the United States. They will demonstrate how the 
combination of laws, customs, and physical borders creates and shapes 
what the Article describes as distinct “Geographies of Displacement,” 
which in turn affect the exercise of fundamental personal liberties.7  
By manipulating territory and moving enemy detainees just outside the 
geographic boundaries of the United States, the United States has been 
able for some time to effectively suspend the rule of law with regard to a 
class of detainees who have been designated “enemy combatants.”8 The 
Supreme Court partially closed this particular territorial gap, at least as a 
matter of constitutional interpretation, in the recent decisions in 
Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States.9 There the Court held 
that aliens detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a territory over which the 
United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control but not legal 
sovereignty, are entitled to the protections of the writ of habeas corpus.10 
Although some of the majority opinion’s statements are open to broad 
interpretations, the Court did not directly address the extraterritorial reach 
of the Constitution in other territories or contexts.11 Guantanamo Bay, 
while certainly the most visible territorial manipulation, is not the only 
“legal black hole”12 the government has sought to create by manipulating 
 
 
 6. ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: ITS THEORY AND HISTORY 19 (1986). 
 7. See NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 7–8 (1994) 
(arguing that law of place is constitutive of political and social relations). 
 8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570–71 & n.1 (2006) (discussing designation and status 
of “‘enemy combatants’”). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus 
Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2031 (2007) 
(discussing legal and constitutional status of “enemy combatants”).  
 9. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 2262. 
 11. The questions left open by Boumediene are discussed in Gerald L. Neuman, The 
Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).  
 12. Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/1
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territory. “Black sites” and destinations of “extraordinary rendition” have 
also been used to situate detainees outside the protection of legal 
processes.13 Primarily as a result of the war on terrorism, a new 
Geography of Justice has taken shape.14  
Immigration policies are by their very nature territorial; among other 
things, they determine rightful presence within a particular territory. Here, 
too, territorial tactics are increasingly prevalent. Congress has appropriated 
funds to supplement existing federal immigration laws with a massive 
steel fence along the Mexican border.15 This grand architecture of 
exclusion will physically and territorially separate America from its 
southern neighbors. As well, federal immigration officials have been 
redefining the very notion of the “border,” in some cases moving the legal 
border into areas within the United States.16 Meanwhile, numerous states 
and localities have enacted their own territorial exclusions, ostensibly to 
combat unlawful immigration.17 Some have threatened to enforce 
trespassing laws against illegal immigrants, thus criminalizing their mere 
presence in a territory.18 Other localities have sought to expel day laborers 
from public areas like street corners and parking lots, through anti-
loitering laws and official harassment.19 A host of local immigration 
measures—supplemented or in some cases supplanted by recent 
 
 
 13. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule 
of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2007) (defining “extraordinary rendition”). To prevent 
this practice, several countries recently ratified a treaty. International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Feb. 6, 2007, http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/ 
IV_16_english.pdf. The United States refused to sign the agreement on the ground that it failed to 
meet U.S expectations. Molly Moore, U.S. Declines to Join Accord on Secret Detentions, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 7, 2007, at A14. The practice of transferring detainees to black sites is discussed in Leila 
Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309 (2006).  
 14. See generally Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005) 
(discussing the importance of territory in recent Supreme Court terrorism cases) [hereinafter Raustiala, 
The Geography of Justice]. Professor Raustiala explores the relationship between geography and legal 
rights in greater detail in KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? 
TERRITORIALITY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter 
RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?]. 
 15. The Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006) (codified as 
passed in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), authorizes the construction of the border fence.  
 16. See Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES 165, 167 (2007) (discussing the flexibility and malleability of the legal territorial 
border). 
 17. See Julia Preston, Immigration is at Center of New Laws Around U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 
2007, at A12 (noting surge in state and local immigration laws). 
 18. See Pam Belluck, Novel Tack on Illegal Immigrants: Trespass Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 
2005, at A14 (describing local arrests). 
 19. See Fernanda Santos, Village Officials Harassed Day Laborers, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 2006, at B3 (noting that in one community police engaged in discriminatory harassment). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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aggressive federal enforcement raids—have sought to prohibit illegal 
immigrants from working or living in certain territories and 
communities.20 These laws impose fines on landlords who rent to 
undocumented aliens, and penalize businesses that employ workers 
without proper proof of immigration status.21 Through such measures, 
municipalities seek to create undocumented-immigrant-free zones. Owing 
to their breadth, however, some of these measures may operate to displace 
legal resident aliens as well as those unlawfully present. Across the United 
States and at its fortified borders, a new Geography of Membership has 
taken shape.  
Among the recently displaced, no group of persons is more reviled than 
convicted sex offenders. Once released into the community, they face an 
intricate system of territorial restrictions designed to exclude them from 
entire communities—sometimes great portions of entire states.22 State and 
local laws forbidding convicted sex offenders from living within a 
specified distance of schools, churches, bus stops, and other “anchor 
points” effectively preclude them from living in many of a state’s most 
populous areas.23 The effect of such measures on individual liberty and 
human dignity can be profound.24 Banishment-by-exclusion, or “internal 
exile,” prevents convicted offenders (regardless, in many cases, of the 
specific nature of their offenses) from living with their families, attending 
their churches, taking part in public recreation, or maintaining their 
livelihoods.25 Other, less systematic territorial measures have also been 
imposed on this group. Sex offenders, along with some persons who have 
merely expressed a sexual interest in children, have been consigned to 
house boats and mobile housing units,26 indefinitely precluded from being 
 
 
 20. See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 787, 799–807 (2008) (describing state and local immigration measures). 
 21. The ordinance adopted by Hazleton, Pennsylvania, is typical of such measures. See, e.g., 
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.hazletoncity.org/ 
090806/2006-18%20_Illegal%20Alien%20Immigration%20Relief%20Act.pdf [hereinafter Hazleton 
Ordinance 2006-18]; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006–13 (Aug. 15, 2006), 2006-13, available at 
http://www.hazletoncity.org/090806/2006-13%20_Landlord%20Tenant%20Ordinance.pdf [hereinafter 
Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13].  
 22. Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex 
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101 (2007). 
 23. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7, 5–13 (2006) (describing recent state and local sex offender exclusion measures).  
 24. In Miami, for example, the local residency exclusion law forced released sex offenders to 
live under a bridge. Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A22.  
 25. Yung, supra note 22, at 122–26 (describing state and local exclusion laws).  
 26. Corey Kilgannon, Suffolk County to Keep Sex Offenders on the Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2007, at B3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/1
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present in community parks and other public places,27 and ordered not to 
come within a specified distance of any child.28 A distinct Geography of 
Punishment has been developed by state and local officials to exert control 
over sex offenders and others deemed a threat to children.  
Most Americans live in urban areas.29 Urban officials have long relied 
upon territoriality to maintain public order, safety, and aesthetics. They 
have increasingly turned to criminal laws to prohibit certain behaviors, 
such as sleeping in public places and panhandling, typically engaged in by 
poor and homeless persons.30 These contemporary descendants of earlier 
“broken windows” measures, often billed as efforts to clean up public 
places like streets, sidewalks, and parks, make it difficult or impossible for 
the homeless and other undesirable populations to remain in certain 
geographic areas.31 Laws banning or spatially restricting sleeping and 
panhandling are only the most common example. Increasingly restrictive 
territorial measures have been enacted to displace marginal populations 
from certain urban areas.32 For example, a recently adopted Los Angeles 
ordinance criminalized the mere presence of the homeless in designated 
public places during certain times of day.33 Other localities have adopted 
measures that prohibit feeding homeless persons in parks and other public 
places.34 This evolving Geography of Purification substantially displaces 
those who live or spend a substantial amount of time in public places. 
Finally, in an age of new and virulent communicable diseases and 
threats from bioterrorism, measures aimed at protecting public health and 
safety may also displace persons territorially. Quarantine and isolation, 
two of the principal measures often relied upon to deal with exposed 
populations, are expressly territorial in nature.35 Although the authority to 
 
 
 27. See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding local order barring 
released sex offender from all public park properties). 
 28. Man Who Put Girls’ Photos on Internet Plans to Move, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, at A13. 
 29. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, CENSUS 2000 POPULATION 
STATISTICS, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/census/cps2k.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 
2008) (indicating that 79% of Americans live in urban areas). 
 30. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, 
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996) (discussing homelessness laws). 
 31. GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996). 
 32. See Katherine Beckett & Steve Herbert, Dealing With Disorder: Social Control in the Post-
Industrial City, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 5, 10–16 (2008) (discussing recent innovations in 
urban social control, including use of trespass laws, parks exclusion laws, and “off-limits orders”). 
 33. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (invalidating ordinance). 
 34. See Randal C. Archibold, Please Don’t Feed Homeless in Parks, Las Vegas Says in 
Ordinance, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at A18. 
 35. On the history and practice of quarantine in the United States, see Felice Batlan, Law in the 
Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quarantines Past and Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 62–
Washington University Open Scholarship
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impose health-related territorial restrictions is well established, 
governments have been shoring up their authority to address new 
contagions territorially.36 Liberties of movement, property, and judicial 
process will be substantially affected, in some cases as a matter of public 
necessity, by this developing Geography of Contagion.  
Territorial regulations like these raise substantial constitutional 
concerns. Constitutional scholars have generally engaged territoriality 
episodically and non-systematically. For example, some scholars have 
analyzed the constitutional right to travel among state territories.37 The 
importance of geography and territory to constitutional jurisdiction has 
also received some scholarly attention, particularly in response to geo-
military strategies associated with the war against terrorism.38 Immigration 
scholars have of course long been aware of the special power of 
territoriality to affect individual rights.39 Finally, some scholars have 
critically examined extraterritorial exercises of state governmental 
authority.40 While each of these lines of inquiry has exposed certain 
features of American territoriality, the intersection of territory and 
constitutional liberty deserves to be more systematically examined. This 
Article frames constitutional liberty as a distinctly spatial and territorial 
concern. It highlights the manner in which laws shape geographies and 
territories, in the process affecting some of our most fundamental 
individual liberties.  
 
 
67 (2007). 
 36. See Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (proposed Nov. 30, 2005) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71); HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/ 
nspi_implementation.pdf; Bush Authorizes Use of Quarantine Powers in Cases of Bird Flu, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A10 (noting that executive order lists several communicable diseases subject 
to quarantine). The exercise of federal quarantine powers has received some recent media attention. 
See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman & John Schwartz, Near Misses Allowed Man With Tuberculosis to Fly 
to and From Europe, Health Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A13. 
 37. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (discussing right to travel interstate). See, e.g., 
Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Reinterpretation, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 433 (1999) 
(discussing travel jurisprudence). 
 38. Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14. The literature on constitutional scope is 
substantial. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002); 
J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against A Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 
(2007).  
 39. See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, 
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (examining significance of territory and geographic 
borders to constitutional citizenship); see also Shachar, supra note 16, at 165 (noting recent 
developments in border regulation and control). 
 40. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, The Right to 
Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992).  
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Part II briefly introduces and, for purposes of this Article, distinguishes 
the spatial concepts of place, geography, and territory. It then describes the 
principal constitutive and governance functions of territoriality. Part III 
describes and analyzes the intersection of territory and liberty in a variety 
of past and present legal Geographies of Displacement. It begins with 
selected antecedent displacements—the territoriality of Jim Crow racial 
segregation, World War II exclusion and internment policies, early state 
and federal immigration restrictions, and the displacement of the sick, the 
contagious, and other vulnerable groups. Part III then examines the five 
contemporary Geographies of Displacement referenced above—Justice, 
Membership, Punishment, Purification, and Contagion—and summarizes 
the constitutional implications of these geographies. This examination 
shows that constitutional displacement—the territorial restriction or denial 
of constitutional liberties—often occurs within rather prominent external 
and internal spatial gaps in our constitutional structure. Part IV examines 
the substantial and sometimes devastating effects of contemporary 
territorial and constitutional displacements, offers some general 
observations regarding the process by which antecedent spatial gaps have 
been narrowed or closed, and concludes with some specific suggestions 
for narrowing or closing the particular spatial gaps identified in this 
Article.  
II. TERRITORIALITY, CONSTITUTION, AND GOVERNANCE 
The spatial regulation of persons and behaviors often affects some 
combination of place, geography, and territory. In order to assess how and 
to what degree spatiality affects constitutional liberty, it will be helpful to 
first identify and distinguish among these spatial concepts. As 
geographers, sociologists, and other social scientists know, there are 
myriad possible conceptions and definitions for these terms.41 For the sake 
of clarity and simplicity, this Article generally treats place as local and 
everyday lived space, geography as primarily an organizational or 
structural concept, and territory as the product of strategic governmental 
regulation.42  
 
 
 41. See, e.g., TIM CRESSWELL, PLACE: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 51 (2004) (describing various 
approaches to the concept of “place”). 
 42. The concept of primary interest in this Article is territory. For a detailed examination of the 
concept of place as it relates to First Amendment liberties, see TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF 
DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2008).  
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Each of these spatial dimensions is critical in constitutional terms. 
Although it is not generally conceptualized by scholars or courts as such, 
the Constitution itself rests upon a distinct spatial framework.43 Spatiality, 
in particular its territorial aspects, affects the Constitution’s scope or reach, 
provides for the national defense, establishes fundamental terms and 
conditions of governance, and affects the recognition and scope of 
individual liberties. The Constitution structures, punishes, immunizes, and 
legitimizes in express or implied spatial terms. Our understanding of the 
Constitution’s ideal of personal liberty, and for more immediate purposes 
our understanding of how various Geographies of Displacement have 
arisen, developed, thrived, and in some cases dissipated, will be 
significantly enhanced by a clearer understanding of how the Constitution 
itself frames matters of territory and spatiality.  
A. Place, Geography, and Territory 
We live our everyday lives in a variety of different local places—
homes, workplaces, public accommodations, private social institutions, 
schools, and communities. A variety of rules, laws, customs, and even 
constitutional principles affect relationships and personal liberties within 
many of these places. For example, airports, public buildings, shopping 
malls, and many other local places are subject to special First Amendment 
regimes.44 Strong privacy rights exist in places like homes and (to a lesser 
extent) schools.45 Equality guarantees, like those in anti-discrimination 
statutes, apply in public and even some private social places.46 As 
discussed below, however, the Constitution is rather opaque with regard to 
specific liberties of place (with the exception of the home). For rather 
obvious reasons, geography and territory were far more fundamental 
concerns at the time of the framing.  
 
 
 43. One very notable exception is Akhil Amar, who emphasizes the framers’ “geostrategic 
vision” regarding the new union of states. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 48 (2005). Amar observes that part of the Framers’ brilliance lay in their recognition of 
the need for geographic unity for purposes of, among other things, national defense and trade. Id. at 
46–48 (discussing Framers’ various geostrategic considerations). 
 44. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 2, at 479–81 (discussing expressive liberties 
in “non-places” like airports and shopping malls). 
 45. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (recognizing right to engage in 
consensual sodomy in the home); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 
(2002) (recognizing limited privacy interests for students in public school setting). See also Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2007) (assessing associational and 
other rights in the various places between home and school). 
 46. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–22 (1984) (holding that there is no 
associational right to exclude women from membership in organization). 
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Our everyday places are situated within geographies—nations, regions, 
states, cities, counties, towns, and neighborhoods. Fundamentally, these 
geographies clarify where we—and our places—are physically located. As 
a constitutional construct, geography identifies and bounds governance 
regimes and legal jurisdictions. These boundaries, of course, have 
profound constitutional significance. At the state and national levels, for 
example, geography defines and limits sovereignty.47 The geographic 
borders of the United States are critical legal and constitutional markers—
in terms of diplomacy, trade, national defense, and claims to individual 
privileges and liberties. As discussed below, local geographies—states, 
cities, and counties—indicate separate, internal sovereign boundaries. 
These spatial jurisdictions have some, but not ultimate, governance 
authority within their geographic borders. Their authority outside 
territorial boundaries is limited; and it is subject to override by a distant 
(geographically speaking) central authority.48  
A territory, by comparison, is neither an ordinary local place nor a 
mere geographic location. According to Robert Sack: 
[I]t is important to distinguish between a territory as a place and 
other types of places. Unlike many ordinary places, territories 
require constant effort to establish and maintain. They are the 
results of strategies to affect, influence, and control people, 
phenomena, and relationships. Circumscribing things in space, or 
on a map, as when a geographer delimits an area to illustrate where 
corn is grown, or where industry is concentrated, identifies places, 
areas, or regions in the ordinary sense, but does not by itself create a 
territory. This delimitation becomes a territory only when its 
boundaries are used to affect behavior by controlling access.49  
Thus, Sack identifies territories according to the following general 
characteristics: (1) a classification by area, (2) a form of communication 
by boundary, and (3) a form of enforcement or control.50 Territory is a 
species or type of place or geography (as I have previously defined these 
terms); ultimately, however, it is different from both these things. It is 
different, as Sack suggests, owing to the exertion of control—not only 
 
 
 47. See generally Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229 (2005) 
(discussing territorial and other aspects of state sovereignty). 
 48. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). 
 49. SACK, supra note 6, at 19 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 21–22. Although Sack mentions control of access as a territorial characteristic, control 
over both ingress and egress are apparently contemplated.  
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over place and geography but, critically, over people, relationships, 
behavior, and phenomena.51 In sum, places, geographic regions, and other 
physical areas become territories when boundaries “are used by some 
authority to mold, influence, or control activities.”52  
This Article examines a variety of legal geographies that meet Sack’s 
general definition of territory. As we shall see in Part III, the legal 
geographies of Justice, Membership, Punishment, Purification, and 
Contagion all represent efforts to create, through communicated and 
legally enforced borders, conditions of control over certain persons 
(detainees, immigrants, sex offenders, the poor and homeless, and the 
sick), relationships, and behaviors.53  
B. Territoriality’s Primary Constitutive Functions 
Territory serves several basic functions insofar as governments are 
concerned. As discussed in this part, it legitimizes and enforces claims to 
sovereignty, defines the Constitution’s scope or jurisdiction, determines 
eligibility for membership in political communities, serves as a basis for 
distributing benefits and privileges, and provides a means for removing or 
isolating dangerous and threatening persons and behaviors. In the abstract, 
these basic territorial functions are not subject to any overarching 
normative objection. Territory is undeniably necessary to effective 
governance and collective goods such as national defense. Defining 
sovereign boundaries, enforcing the rule of law, and protecting public 
health, order, and safety are all legitimate governance functions. As we 
shall see, however, in certain applications territoriality can and does 
substantially restrict and even extinguish constitutional liberties. 
1. Territory, Sovereignty, and Governance 
Territory and sovereignty are intimately related. This is true even in the 
postmodern world, where boundaries and borders can seem less and less 
significant.54 Sovereigns use territory to control access to the critical prize 
 
 
 51. Id. at 19. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Although this Article uses Sack’s basic definition of territoriality, the focus will be somewhat 
narrower. For example, Sack’s conception of territoriality does not distinguish among the various 
persons or institutions that exercise control territorially. This Article focuses solely upon strategic and 
other productions of territory by governments and officials. Moreover, although Sack’s definition of 
territoriality is broad enough to encompass non-human subjects, the Article is concerned only with 
territorial displacement of persons.  
 54. There is a rich literature in geography and political science examining territory and its 
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of membership or citizenship.55 As discussed below, lawful presence 
inside a territory determines membership in a political community and 
legitimizes certain claims to rights and privileges that accompany this 
status.56 Residence and citizenship may be prerequisites to the right to 
vote, to run for and hold political office, and to obtain certain jobs. 
Governments also enforce territorial boundaries as a means of internal and 
external defense. Within its territory, for example, a sovereign is 
empowered to prosecute violations of its laws.57 To enforce the spatiality 
of citizenship and membership, sovereigns must possess the authority to 
control territorial borders—to repel and expel.  
The United States Constitution is a spatial framework in this and many 
other critical governance respects. The Framers focused intently on 
territorial boundaries in forming a special kind of geopolitical Union.58 
They were defining—physically and otherwise—a new nation. The 
nation’s sovereignty was defined, first and foremost, by reference to the 
new government’s control over territory. This intersection of sovereignty 
and territory was critical in post-founding eras as well. Thus, as Sarah 
Cleveland has noted, “[t]erritoriality was integral to nineteenth century 
concepts of sovereignty because, under international law principles, a 
sovereign’s jurisdiction to legally regulate conduct was coterminous with 
its territory.”59 Despite the effects of globalization, and in particular the 
rise of new governance structures throughout the world, today territory 
and sovereignty remain intricately linked.60 As we shall see, this 
traditional relationship has created new opportunities for territorial 
manipulation by governments—and new challenges to constitutional 
liberty.  
With respect to matters of internal governance, the Constitution frames 
and organizes in explicit spatial terms. The Framers used place, 
 
 
relation to sovereignty. See, e.g., JOHN A. AGNEW, PLACE AND POLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHICAL 
MEDIATION OF STATE AND SOCIETY (1987); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE 
REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989).  
 55. For a discussion of the significance of territorial presence as it relates to immigration law and 
policy, see generally Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 
8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389 (2007).  
 56. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (defining citizenship by reference to place of birth or 
naturalization). 
 57. See Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008) (holding that Iraq has authority to prosecute 
alleged crimes by United States citizens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and allegedly committed 
crimes on Iraqi soil). 
 58. See AMAR, supra note 43, at 45–51 (discussing Framers’ strategic thinking with regard to 
geography and territory).  
 59. See Cleveland, supra note 38, at 23.  
 60. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 14. 
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geography, and territory to establish the location, permanence, and 
stability of governance institutions. The central government itself was 
situated in a specially constituted territory—the District of Columbia. As 
the seat of federal power, the District was (and in many respects remains) 
subject to congressional control.61 It is a unique territory-within-a-
territory. The Framers also established the separate chambers of Congress 
as distinct places of governance. They gave each House the power to make 
its own rules of procedure and internal organization.62 The Houses are in 
many respects spatial enclaves—places of immunity from various legal 
prosecutions and liabilities.63 The Framers also granted legislators 
immunity from being “questioned in any other Place” with regard to 
statements made in Congress.64 Finally, the Framers established the 
territorial permanence of the legislature by providing that neither House 
may adjourn to “any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall 
be sitting.”65 The Framers were thus acutely aware of the utility and power 
of place, geography, and territory when it came to constituting a 
permanent locus of central governmental power.  
Of course, the biggest spatial challenge facing the Framers was not to 
establish governance institutions, but to bind the former colonies together 
into a new Union. The Framers used natural geography and territory as 
special binding agents. In The Federalist No. 2, Publius described America 
as “one connected . . . country” with a “succession of navigable waters 
form[ing] a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together.”66 
With regard to commerce, broadly defined, the Framers envisioned “a 
demilitarized interstate free-trade zone.”67 But they also sought to preserve 
the states’ own territorial boundaries. Thus, the Constitution’s spatial 
blueprint expressly provides that “no new State shall be formed or erected 
within the Jurisdiction of any other State”; nor may any state be joined 
with another absent the consent of both states and Congress.68 Chief 
Justice Marshall famously summarized the union’s political geography: 
“No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the 
 
 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 62. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
 63. See id. art. I, § 6 (Speech and Debate Clause). 
 64. Id. (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (emphasis added). 
 66. THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 38 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossier ed., 1961). 
 67. AMAR, supra note 43, at 47. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
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lines which separate the states, and of compounding the American people 
into one common mass.”69 
The constitutional principle of dual sovereignty is, of course, based in 
large part upon preservation of state territorial boundaries. In both physical 
and conceptual terms, the Constitution grants a space of residual 
sovereignty to the states.70 Within their own spaces, the states retain 
fundamental internal sovereign prerogatives.71 They choose their own 
(republican) forms of government, hold elections, and determine the 
qualifications of those who may vote and be elected.72 With regard to 
internal governance, the Framers provided that Congress may alter the 
time, place, and manner of state elections; but it was not permitted to alter 
“the places of choosing Senators.”73 In sum, the states were to be locally 
sovereign territories, subject of course to override by all federal laws made 
in pursuance of the Constitution—“the supreme Law of the Land.”74 By 
thus mixing separate central and state territories, the Framers used 
spatiality in ingenious ways—to check and balance the powers granted in 
the Constitution, and to plant the seeds of territorial connection (national, 
state, regional, and local) that exist to this day.75  
Of course, this structure and organization would all be for naught if the 
new government was imperiled by threats from within or outside the new 
territory of the United States. In matters of internal defense, the Framers 
once again turned to geography and territory to “insure domestic 
Tranquility.”76 In general, the Framers had what Akhil Amar refers to as a 
“geostrategic vision” with regard to both internal and external defense, one 
that Professor Amar says “informed much of the antebellum Constitution’s 
overall structure and many of its specific words.”77 The Constitution’s 
intricate web of spatial relations—including its prohibition on standing 
armies, the preservation of state militias, and the requirement that states be 
protected against territorial invasion78—was “designed to bind Americans 
 
 
 69. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 198 (1819).  
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited to 
the states to the states or the people). 
 71. See Zick, supra note 47, at 288–93 (discussing attributes of internal state sovereignty). 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). The Constitution does not refer to more local polities or communities 
such as counties, towns, boroughs, villages, or cities. These territories are governed by states as a 
function of their residual sovereignty.  
 74. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. (emphasis added). 
 75. See SACK, supra note 6, at 153 (observing that framers conceived of territory “as a means of 
defining and molding social relations”). 
 76. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 77. AMAR, supra note 43, at 51.  
 78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; id. amend. II; id. art. IV, § 3.  
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of different regions together and thus prevent the parts from ever warring 
against one another or against the whole.”79 Of course, as the Civil War 
attests, the geographic and other bonds of Union could become 
dangerously strained. Still, one must marvel at the extent to which the 
Framers’ ingenious geo-strategic framework has generally preserved 
internal and external security in and for the United States.  
The Constitution’s essential blueprint demonstrates that the Framers 
were acutely aware of the legitimating, binding, stabilizing, and protective 
functions of geography and territory. But the foregoing discussion merely 
sketches the original spatial skin of the constitutional corpus. After 
massive territorial expansions and the growth of government itself, the 
“Land” now governed by the Constitution is characterized by thick 
membranes of overlapping and intersecting territories.80 As we shall see, 
constitutional liberties are profoundly affected by these various 
intersections and by the spatial gaps left open at the original and later 
framings.  
2. Territory and Constitutional Domain  
As the discussion of sovereignty suggests, one of the primary functions 
of territory is to define the scope or domain of a sovereign’s authority. For 
all their brilliance and prescience, however, the Framers failed to answer 
some very basic but critical questions regarding the Constitution’s domain: 
where and to whom does the Constitution apply? As Gerald Neuman has 
observed: “Defining the domain of constitutionalism has major practical 
implications for immigration policy, the conduct of foreign affairs, 
military action, and the participation of American citizens in an 
increasingly global society.”81 Issues of constitutional scope or jurisdiction 
will be discussed in more detail in Parts III and IV. As we shall see, the 
Constitution’s conflicting statements regarding scope or jurisdiction have 
generated confusion regarding the relationship between territorial presence 
and constitutional liberties, as well as various strategic opportunities for 
territorial and constitutional displacement.82 
The Framers of the Constitution did not speak very clearly at all with 
regard to the relationship between territory and constitutional scope. As 
 
 
 79. AMAR, supra note 43, at 51. 
 80. U.S. CONST., art. VI (Supremacy Clause). 
 81. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 3. 
 82. For a comprehensive treatment of issues of constitutional scope or domain, see RAUSTIALA, 
DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?, supra note 14. 
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Gerald Neuman has observed, “[t]he domain of U.S. constitutionalism has 
always been contested, and it has grown as the nation has grown.”83 
Certain individual rights, such as those protected by Article IV’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, are plainly available only to persons 
who are citizens of and reside within state territories.84 The Constitution 
contains a few other hints of localism as well. The Supremacy Clause 
states that the Constitution and all laws made “in Pursuance thereof” shall 
be the “supreme Law of the Land,”85 suggesting to some interpreters that 
constitutional liberties are limited to the physical area within United States 
borders.86 Other hints of localism are evident in the Preamble, which 
reads: “We the People of the United States, in Order to . . . secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”87 This 
language suggests to some that only native-born persons physically 
present on U.S. soil have legitimate claims to constitutional liberties.88 
As scholars have noted, however, the constitutional text also appears to 
be universal in scope or domain.89 For example, the Constitution’s express 
limits on governmental powers do not contain any explicit territorial 
parameters.90 Moreover, the liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights and 
elsewhere are afforded generally to “persons” or “the people.”91 As Sarah 
Cleveland has observed, “most of the Constitution’s provisions are not 
textually restricted by either the population or the geographic area to 
which they apply. Instead, they define the general powers of the national 
government or impose general limits on the exercise of these powers.”92 
Thus, for example, Article I unqualifiedly prohibits the suspension of 
habeas corpus and the adoption of ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.93  
We shall return to the rather complicated and contested subject of 
constitutional domain later. At least as a textual matter, to the extent the 
 
 
 83. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 3. 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or [shall any state] deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  
 85. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 86. See Kent, supra note 38, at 466 (arguing against constitutional universalism, but conceding 
that the framing materials do not speak clearly with respect to territorial scope). 
 87. U.S. CONST. pmbl (emphasis added). 
 88. Kent, supra note 38, at 510. 
 89. E.g., Cleveland, supra note 38, at 19. 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (setting forth limits on central power). 
 91. Id. amend. V, XIV, X. From a very early time, aliens have been considered “persons” for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (applying 
Equal Protection Clause to claims of aliens).  
 92. Cleveland, supra note 38, at 19. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.  
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Framers addressed matters of scope or jurisdiction, their language was 
arguably more universal than expressly local.94 Still, currents of 
constitutional localism remain quite strong, and in some sense are also 
inscribed in text. As we shall see, broader structural principles and 
constitutional values have increasingly been relied upon to resolve textual 
uncertainties with regard to domain and to settle jurisdictional conflicts.  
3. Territoriality and Political Community 
At every level of government, territorial borders are enforced in order 
to control access to certain benefits and privileges. Lawful presence within 
a territory signifies an intention to be bound by the law of the land; 
residence advances one toward fuller acceptance of the social compact 
(citizenship). Movement into territory may be discouraged, or expulsion 
sought, in order to conserve certain benefits for those deemed legitimately 
present, to uphold the rule of law, and to generally ensure that persons are 
rightfully entitled to be in a particular territory.  
In contrast to the general subject of constitutional scope, the Framers 
spoke with considerable clarity regarding the territorial requisites for 
obtaining full membership in the nation’s political communities. With 
regard to the privileges of election and governance, for example, the 
Framers relied heavily upon geographic and territorial rules. Eligibility for 
election to both Houses of Congress is based, in part, upon citizenship and 
residency.95 One’s place of birth determines eligibility for the office of the 
Presidency; only “natural born” United States citizens (and those who 
have “been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States”) may seek 
the office.96 Birth within the United States entitles one to the privileges 
and immunities of United States citizenship.97 Place of residence 
determines state citizenship, with its corresponding rights and privileges.98 
 
 
 94. A somewhat superficial textual examination does not, of course, address the considerable 
gloss of history or the policies in favor of or against a universalist interpretation of the Constitution. It 
is worth noting that even those who read the text as exhibiting a narrow scope concede that the 
framing materials shed very little light on the matter of constitutional domain. See Kent, supra note 38, 
at 466 (finding little explicit evidence for universalist or localist approaches in the ratification debates). 
The point of this discussion is simply to flag instances in which the Framers appear to have at least 
considered the Constitution’s general scope or domain.  
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I § 3, cl. 3. 
 96. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Some have been quite critical of this particular spatial limitation. See, 
e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES 
WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 152–54 (2006) (critiquing the geographic and 
territorial aspects of eligibility for presidential office).  
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 98. Id. 
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In sum, under the original geography of membership persons not properly 
anchored to United States geography and territory were not entitled to full 
membership privileges.  
Why did the Framers adopt such a specific focus on geographic and 
territorial nexus with respect to political membership? For one thing, the 
ratification of the Constitution was intended to ensure that Americans 
would no longer be governed by masters from distant lands.99 The Framers 
may also have believed that connection to territory generally served as an 
accurate proxy for loyalty, local knowledge of customs and conditions, 
and democratic representation. Territorial presence and residence were 
thought to signify intent to enter the nation’s social compact, as well as 
acceptance of uniquely American ideals and values.100 Fear that radical 
ideologies would be imported from other territories also influenced the 
Constitution’s distinct geography of governance.101 Finally, in more 
pragmatic terms, territorial residency rules prevented interstate 
manipulation of state elections.102 For these and other reasons, the Framers 
required that governors and governed share a connection to state territories 
as well as to the new territory of the United States.  
Some scholars have argued that placing such substantial weight on 
territorial attachments has resulted in serious political and societal harms. 
Sanford Levinson, for example, decries what he calls the “bias toward 
localism” inherent in the Constitution’s territorial rules.103 Levinson and 
other scholars trace the rampant regionalism of the Civil War era, as well 
as the contemporary political geography (“red state”/“blue state”), to the 
Framers’ glorification of territorial localism.104 One might add to such 
costs the seemingly pervasive fear and distrust of those deemed to be 
territorial “outsiders.” As we shall see, some of the Geographies of 
Displacement discussed in Part III are rooted in these founding principles 
of territorial localism.  
 
 
 99. AMAR, supra note 43, at 69–70 (noting sentiment that “aliens owing allegiance to foreign 
nations and foreign lords could not properly lead America”). 
 100. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 9–13 (discussing the importance of social contract theory to 
principles of membership and alienage). 
 101. Id.  
 102. See AMAR, supra note 43, at 70 (observing that state residency requirement prevented 
“wealthy candidates from gaming the system”). 
 103. LEVINSON, supra note 96, at 147–48. 
 104. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006) 
(tracing regionalism of politics in 1850s and 1860s to constitutional localism). 
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4. Territoriality, Presence, and Privileges  
As the foregoing discussion of political membership demonstrates, one 
of the fundamental functions or utilities of territory is to preserve certain 
privileges and benefits for those lawfully present in a territory. Access to 
these privileges is often determined by restrictions on presence within a 
territory. This entails regulation of both ingress to and egress from a 
sovereign’s territory.  
Although they were not silent on the matter, the Framers spoke with 
less than ideal clarity regarding authority over ingress at the nation’s 
territorial borders. Congress was granted power to regulate foreign 
commerce and to determine a “uniform Rule of Naturalization.”105 
Moreover, the central government’s responsibility for national defense 
necessarily granted some implied authority over territorial borders. Still, 
the colonies and early states aggressively policed their own borders, 
excluding and expelling various persons and groups whose presence they 
considered harmful, threatening, or repugnant to the community.106 By the 
late nineteenth century, however, the federal government had essentially 
occupied the field of national immigration as an aspect of its own 
sovereignty.107 Since that time, federal restrictions on territorial ingress 
have been imposed in furtherance of policies of national security, foreign 
relations, and domestic well-being.108 With regard to those already present, 
expulsion or deportation is, of course, a territorial response to violation of 
a sovereign’s laws or norms. Among other things, expulsion results in a 
denial of all privileges associated with presence and membership. Within 
very broad limits, federal authorities are now able to condition access to a 
multitude of benefits by controlling territorial ingress and physical 
presence.  
 
 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, cl. 4. 
 106. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 62–67 (discussing colonial and early state quarantine laws); see 
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 29 (1824) (singling out state quarantine laws as valid 
state regulations of commerce). 
 107. See Cleveland, supra note 38, at 100–12 (discussing path to federal control of immigration). 
 108. Some restrictions on territorial ingress raise serious and, in some cases, unresolved 
constitutional questions. For example, the federal government has denied, and continues to deny, entry 
to the United States to certain speakers on national security and other grounds. See Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding that government need only provide “a facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason” for refusal to grant alien speaker a waiver of excludability). Exclusions of alien 
speakers that are based on ideological grounds raise substantial First Amendment concerns. Steven R. 
Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 
(1987). The nation’s borders have sometimes been treated as constitutional non-places, where certain 
liberties apply differently or not at all. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925) 
(excluding border searches from Fourth Amendment restrictions).  
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As critical as they are to political membership and its attendant 
privileges, territory and geography are not always determinative of access 
to local privileges and largesse. In certain critical respects the 
Constitution, explicitly or through longstanding judicial interpretation, 
actually submerges geography and territory. For example, by 
unambiguous design and longstanding judicial interpretation, the 
Constitution prohibits governments from making certain territorial 
distinctions in order to preserve unity, ensure comity, and even protect 
fundamental liberties like the right to vote.109 More generally, the 
Constitution substantially limits (although it does not entirely prohibit) 
state and local efforts to link governmental benefits to territory. Thus, for 
example, when they seek to reward or encourage territorial presence or 
residence by providing additional welfare payments or other subsidies, 
governments must respect a limited but fundamental “right to travel” 
across state borders.110 Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause and 
the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause similarly circumscribe state and 
local authority to discriminate against territorial outsiders in favor of local 
residents.111  
Within these general limits, however, states and localities can and do 
preserve certain benefits for those lawfully within their territorial borders. 
Local tax laws, business subsidies, and public works projects often serve 
this purpose.112 In addition, many states and localities expressly condition 
receipt of certain local benefits, opportunities, and privileges upon 
territorial residence. For example, some local governments require that 
public officials or employees live within a particular district or regional 
territory as a condition of their employment.113 Local zoning laws can also 
indirectly but substantially control population influx into certain 
 
 
 109. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. § 2 (Extradition Clause). 
Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (holding that “one person, one vote” rule generally 
forbids legislatures from apportioning the franchise with reference to geography).  
 110. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (holding that durational residency 
requirement for welfare benefits violated equal protection and right to interstate travel). See also Saenz 
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–02 (1999) (discussing scope and contours of right to travel); Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating state law impeding interstate travel of indigent persons).  
 111. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (striking down state protectionist 
measure). See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (discussing limits of anti-
protectionism principle).  
 112. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214 
(1983) (holding that mayoral order requiring that half of work force for city-funded project must 
consist of local residents did not violate the commerce clause). 
 113. See Wright v. City of Jackson, Miss., 506 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding 
requirement that all municipal employees live within boundaries of city). 
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territories.114 As we shall see, states and localities often impose expulsive 
measures on criminals and other marginal populations, effectively 
depriving them of basic local benefits. These and similar measures can 
significantly affect the freedom to be present and liberty of movement 
within local territories.  
Finally, governments sometimes seek to limit egress from territories. 
At the federal level, for example, the United States government imposes 
extraterritorial travel restrictions for reasons of national security or foreign 
policy.115 Recreational and other benefits associated with travel abroad 
may thus be denied owing to countervailing national interests. In an effort 
to extend the geographic reach of local laws and policies, states sometimes 
seek to indirectly limit egress from their territories. A state may do so by 
purporting to deny its citizens benefits available in other territories. It 
might, for example, refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage procured by 
one of its citizens in another state, or seek to punish its citizens for 
procuring abortions elsewhere.116 In these and other instances, 
governments seek to extend their control over benefits and privileges 
extraterritorially.  
5. Territoriality and Police Powers  
As used in this Article, the concept of territory is not limited to control 
of geographic areas that constitute states or nation-states. Territory also 
has an important local dimension. Incident to their police powers, local 
authorities routinely use territorial displacement to protect communities 
from dangerous or threatening persons, behaviors, and events. Here, again, 
the Constitution speaks only faintly with regard to the propriety of 
territorial restrictions.  
As Michel Foucault noted in several works, control over place or 
territory can be a very effective means of disciplining and controlling 
populations and behaviors.117 Foucault noted that place, as he conceived 
 
 
 114. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and 
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 795 (1969) (discussing equal protection doctrine as applied to 
exclusionary or “snob” zoning). 
 115. See generally Daniel A. Farber, National Security, The Right to Travel, and the Court, 1981 
SUP. CT. REV. 263 (discussing restrictions on international travel). 
 116. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 856–60 (2002) (describing state laws with extraterritorial effects).  
 117. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (Richard Howard trans., 
R.D. Laing ed., 1967) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (A.M. Sheridan trans., R.D. Laing ed., 1976); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
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it, is useful in serving the first need of government—namely, to maintain 
order.118 As he observed, spatial measures tend to “perfect the exercise of 
power” by restricting a person’s locomotion and mobility.119 This 
particular use of territory is quite common. To take the most obvious 
example, as of 2005 over two million people were incarcerated in the 
United States.120  
As this example illustrates, spatial segregation and exclusion may be 
wholly legitimate responses to public safety concerns. Imprisonment is a 
sanctioned use of territoriality—a form of deserved spatial, legal, and 
(partial) constitutional displacement. In other instances, however, 
segregation and other means of displacement may serve as a pretext for 
discriminatory treatment of vulnerable or unpopular persons. Foucault 
examined how officials routinely use spatiality to separate ailing 
communities from healthy ones, the sane from the insane, and men of 
higher ranks from those of lower ranks.121 Some of the territorial measures 
discussed in this Article use territory in precisely this fashion; these 
restrictions can result in substantial losses of individual liberty.122  
Territoriality can be a very subtle form of control. As Foucault 
emphasized, most territorial measures are imposed without resort to 
visible force or violence.123 As a result, although they may be quite 
dangerous to personal liberty, the power and effects of territorial measures 
are in some cases not obvious or wholly apparent. We shall encounter 
several subtle but substantial forms of displacement in the discussion of 
the Geographies of Displacement (Parts III and IV). As Foucault also 
observed, resort to spatiality or territory often produces more than mere 
regulation of populations and behaviors. Displacement sometimes has a 
communicative function; it may brand those who are displaced.124 The 
 
 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 
1995) (1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH]. 
 118. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 174 (noting that through the 
power of place, the state could impose “an exact geometry” upon disorder and dissent). 
 119. Id. at 206. 
 120. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 2005 
(Nov. 2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p05.pdf.  
 121. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 199.  
 122. See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the 
Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990) (describing effects of police tactics on right to move within 
territory).  
 123. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 177 (noting that control was 
exercised through “the laws of optics and mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines, 
screens, beams, [and] degrees”).  
 124. Id. at 199. 
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spatial division, segregation, and restriction of movement occasioned by 
certain exercises of police powers may communicate to the public at large 
that a person or class of persons is morally flawed, dangerous, or 
contagious. In this respect territoriality speaks, through segregation or 
expulsion, to things like status and human dignity.  
The Constitution does not speak very clearly with regard to liberties of 
mobility and choice of place—the liberties most affected by territorial 
restrictions imposed pursuant to traditional police powers. Indeed, on only 
a few occasions did the Framers expressly use geography or territory to 
delineate the bounds of individual liberty. For example, Article III 
simultaneously respects state sovereignty and protects personal liberty by 
requiring that the trial of all crimes be held only in the state where the 
crime was committed.125 The Sixth Amendment requires the use of 
geographic districts for the empanelment of representative juries.126 These 
defensive or negative references to place are additional examples of the 
Framers’ geo-strategic governance structure.  
But what of the affirmative rights to move about the country, to choose 
places and geographies, to change one’s place, and to remain in place? 
What are the limits of state and local police powers with respect to these 
and related spatial liberties?  
Historically, there was some explicit support for treating some such 
liberties as fundamental. Blackstone referred to “the power of loco-
motion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever 
place one’s own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, 
unless by due course of law.”127 The Articles of Confederation expressly 
provided for liberty of movement among the states.128  
But the Constitution does not specifically address this or other aspects 
of personal movement or mobility in explicit terms. Zechariah Chafee, 
among others, has suggested that the omission of migratory freedom in 
particular merely indicates that the Framers believed this liberty to be 
located elsewhere in the text.129 But colonial and early state migratory 
exclusions and expulsions, discussed earlier, would seem to suggest some 
 
 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Where the crime is not committed in any state, the trial shall 
be held “at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” Id.  
 126. Id. amend. VI. 
 127. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *130.  
 128. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (“[T]he people of each state shall have free ingress 
and regress to and from any other state. . . .”). 
 129. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 185 
(1956). 
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ambivalence toward explicit recognition of such migratory freedom.130 In 
1867, however, a majority on the Supreme Court did indeed recognize a 
right to migrate among the states.131 The Court has never settled on a 
constitutional home for this liberty.132 Thus, it remains the case that one 
must ultimately infer constitutional recognition of even the most basic 
spatial liberty—to “remov[e] one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own 
inclination may direct.”133  
In certain respects it seems that the Framers of the Constitution 
envisioned a private, parochial, and rather sedentary people. Only one 
specific place—the home—was singled out for special constitutional 
treatment. The home is a consecrated constitutional location, one expressly 
shielded from various official intrusions. The Third Amendment prohibits 
the quartering of soldiers during peacetime “in any house” without the 
owner’s consent;134 the Fourth Amendment expressly protects the right of 
the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures”;135 and the Fifth Amendment 
prohibits the taking of any home (or other private property) without just 
compensation.136 The Second Amendment’s right to “bear Arms,” which 
the Supreme Court recently interpreted to include a right of self-defense in 
the home, may also indicate regard for the sanctity of both person and 
residence.137  
 
 
 130. In certain respects, the Constitution’s overall spatial framework seems to contemplate an 
open and unified geography. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states); id. § 10, cl. 2 (prohibiting states from imposing duties on 
imports or exports unless “absolutely necessary”). 
 131. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).  
 132. See Christopher S. Maynard, Nine-Headed Caesar: The Supreme Court’s Thumbs-Up 
Approach to the Right to Travel, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 298 (2000) (noting that right to travel 
has been located in no less than ten constitutional provisions). 
 133. BLACKSTONE, supra note 127, at *124. Nor did the framers address whether liberty of travel 
might be offended by restrictions on travel to territories outside the United States. See Farber, supra 
note 115, at 285.  
 134. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 135. Id. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable” seizures, as well as 
the Due Process Clause, may also provide some limited protection for liberties of presence and 
movement. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972) (invalidating anti-
vagrancy law). 
 136. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 137. Id. amend. II. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (invalidating gun 
control statutes in part because they denied persons the ability to defend the home). Other liberties 
associated with the home have been located in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Frisby 
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ordinance prohibiting targeted picketing of home); Lindsey 
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (describing home as “sanctuary”). As the Supreme Court recently 
stated, the “liberty” referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is comprised of 
both “spatial” and “transcendent” dimensions. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) 
(emphasis added).  
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Americans, of course, have never been a home-bound people. The 
urges to traverse, explore, and conquer open spaces and territories are 
central to the American ethos.138 Moreover, although privacy has become 
a contemporary buzzword, Americans have always lived a substantial part 
of their lives in public places. Yet the Framers seem to have scarcely 
contemplated the exercise of personal liberties in the public sphere. The 
First Amendment protects the people’s right “peaceably to assemble” and 
to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”139 But it does not 
say where those liberties may lawfully be exercised, or whether there is a 
right to some public place for these (or other) purposes.140 Moreover, even 
assuming one recognizes some degree of migratory liberty, there is no 
express or implied guarantee that one may remain in any particular place. 
Nor does the Constitution address whether those without private homes 
enjoy any right to be present—to exist, in other words—in public places or 
territories. In sum, the Constitution does not clearly address the 
substantive legitimacy of a myriad of local police power measures that 
impose different forms of territorial expulsion. As in other contexts, it 
contains some rather significant spatial gaps.  
To summarize, the principal constitutive functions of territory are to 
structure and legitimize sovereignty; define constitutional scope or 
domain; determine eligibility for membership in political communities; 
facilitate distribution and allocation of certain benefits and privileges; and 
segregate and control persons or behaviors considered threatening to 
public health, order, or safety. To varying degrees, the United States 
Constitution addresses each of these functions geographically or 
territorially. Given the most pressing concerns of the moment, the Framers 
of the Constitution exhibited the greatest spatial clarity with respect to 
matters of internal governance and territorial defense. As a result, they 
bequeathed to future generations some rather challenging questions 
regarding the relevance or importance of territory to matters such as 
constitutional domain and individual liberties.  
 
 
 138. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1921). 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 140. The Supreme Court has indicated that at least some public places—streets and parks—must 
be held open for assembly and speech activities. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496 
(1939); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting 
that public streets and sidewalks have “time out of mind” been used for public assembly and debate).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT 541 
 
 
 
 
III. GEOGRAPHIES OF DISPLACEMENT  
Given the connection between territory and some of the principal needs 
and functions of government, it should come as little surprise that officials 
have often used territory to control events, populations, and certain 
behaviors. Historical episodes of racial segregation, internment, 
immigration exclusion and restriction, and segregation of the sick and 
infirm were explicit territorial responses to perceived threats of the day. 
Today, governments are responding territorially to a very similar list of 
perceived threats—alien enemies and suspected terrorists, illegal 
immigrants, sex offenders, the destitute and homeless, and the contagious. 
The territorial regulation of these populations and their behaviors is 
mapping distinctive legal Geographies of Displacement both within and 
outside the borders of the United States.  
A. Some Antecedent Territorial Measures  
Territory and constitutional liberty have intersected throughout 
American history. Systematic racial segregation, wartime exclusion and 
internment, exclusion of migrants and immigrants, and displacement of 
sick and marginalized persons were critical episodes in our nation’s 
constitutional history. In these instances governments segregated, 
disciplined and controlled persons and behaviors through territory. They 
limited access to justice, equality, mobility, and other core constitutional 
liberties. Further, through these territorial measures officials 
communicated something distinct about the character of those displaced—
for example, their lack of dignity or loyalty. The selection and discussion 
of specific antecedent displacements in this part is not intended to suggest 
a moral or other normative equivalence with the more contemporary 
displacements described in the next part. As we shall see, however, there 
are some instructive parallels and useful lessons to be learned from this 
history.  
1. Racial Segregation and “Hyper-Territoriality”  
Perhaps the most infamous example of territorial displacement is the 
post-emancipation segregation and exclusion imposed upon blacks. At its 
very core, segregation was a spatial and territorial institution. Official 
policies, coupled with local customs, imposed what the geographer David 
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Delaney has described as the “geopolitics of race and racism.”141 Whites 
were deeply threatened by the prospect that newly emancipated blacks 
would soon be living among them, in “their” territories. Denied the power 
of institutional slavery, whites enforced their vision of power and status by 
asserting control over local territories.  
From the late 1800s to the mid-1960s, Black Codes and Jim Crow laws 
created an extraordinary form of territorial segregation.142 Southern and 
border-state territorial measures enforced strict and well-defined territorial 
boundaries with respect to all aspects of society.143 The infamous Black 
Codes denied blacks access to both private and public places and 
territories. Under the Codes, and later pursuant to pervasive Jim Crow 
legislation, racial segregation and exclusion were enforced “in the courts, 
schools, and libraries, in parks, theaters, hotels and residential districts, in 
hospitals, insane asylums—everywhere, including on sidewalks and in 
cemeteries.”144 This spatial-racial segregation extended well beyond places 
of public accommodation. In some instances, blacks were forbidden to 
appear in public at all—other than as menial servants.145 Vagrancy laws 
restricted their right to appear on the public streets. Even prostitutes of 
different races were made to work separate streets, districts, and 
localities.146 Private residential segregation was also strictly enforced, 
through public laws and private racially restrictive covenants.147 In urban 
and residential areas the imposition of “municipal apartheid” through 
zoning codes prevented blacks from living in certain neighborhoods.148  
David Delaney characterizes this history as a “process of fanatical 
hyper-territoriality.”149 Vast geographies were reshaped in this fashion, on 
explicit racial-territorial terms. As Delaney explains, this process 
 
 
 141. DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW 1836–1948, at 3 (1998). 
 142. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). See also 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).  
 143. See DELANEY, supra note 141, at 96–97 (discussing segregation measures during Jim Crow 
era). 
 144. IX C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877–1913, at 212 (Wendell Holmes 
Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1951). See also J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO 
BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978, at 17–18 (1979). 
 145. See WILKINSON, supra note 144. 
 146. Id. at 18. 
 147. See Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 505 (2006) (discussing use of private restrictive covenants). 
 148. DELANEY, supra note 141, at 105. 
 149. Id. at 96. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT 543 
 
 
 
 
presupposed the creation of more or less durable lines and spaces or 
the addition of an increment of meaning to existing lines and 
spaces. It entailed the assignment of consequences to the crossing of 
lines. It was constituted by ensembles of stationary space, such as 
rooms, toilets, buildings, parks, and cemeteries, and by movable 
spaces such as streetcars, trains, and later buses and airplanes. In 
some situations segregation was effected by duplication of 
functional spaces: schools, parks, cemeteries, bars, YMCAs, 
libraries, washrooms, phone booths, and elevators; in other 
situations, by subdivision or compartmentalization, as in waiting 
rooms, jails, theaters, some hospitals, streetcars, and so on. In many 
instances segregation meant the simple denial of facilities.150  
The exclusion and displacement effected through racial “hyper-
territoriality”151 were devastating to personal liberties. There was, of 
course, the denial of basic rights of equality, liberty of movement, and 
public presence. More generally, and with even more devastating effects, 
race-based territoriality communicated blacks’ fundamental inferiority and 
lack of human dignity; it signified their legal and societal expulsion. Of 
course, as Delaney notes, “[e]xclusion and inferiority were integral to the 
entire system of radical segregation.”152  
Remarkably, much of this systematic race-based displacement occurred 
in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit guarantee of “equal 
protection” to all “persons” residing within a state’s territory.153 Despite 
this textual command of individual equality, an enormous spatial gap in 
constitutional coverage stubbornly persisted in America. In the late 
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court infamously approved de jure race-
based displacement. In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court upheld a Louisiana 
statute requiring separate but equal accommodations for white and black 
railway passengers.154 Plessy and other decisions of the long segregationist 
era refused to acknowledge the damage produced by this territorial and 
 
 
 150. Id. at 96–97. 
 151. Id. at 96. 
 152. Id. at 97. 
 153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 154. 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896). From the time of emancipation, these and other local spatial 
limitations were often supplemented with additional territorial restrictions. For example, immediately 
after emancipation, exit from the system of racial-spatial discrimination was made difficult by the 
passage, in both Northern and Southern states, of laws prohibiting or restricting the migration of newly 
freed slaves. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 34–40 (discussing antebellum restrictions on black 
migration). 
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constitutional displacement.155 Not until 1954, in Brown v. Board of 
Education, did the Supreme Court formally recognize that the spatial 
scheme of “separate but equal” stigmatized and unconstitutionally 
delegitimized an entire race of people.156 Of course, the formal rejection of 
de jure displacement was merely a beginning. It would take a civil rights 
era to further narrow the spatio-equality gap in which segregation thrived. 
The effects of that gap persist to some extent even today.  
2. Territory, Security and Loyalty 
As noted in Part II, territoriality is intimately related to security and 
national defense. As it was at the framing, securing the homeland from 
external (and internal) enemies is one of the principal governance 
functions of territoriality. As also noted earlier, territory both enforces 
sovereign boundaries and protects public health and safety.  
The operation of the prison at Guantanamo Bay is only the most recent 
example of the territorial displacement of those perceived to be hostile to 
the United States. During the winter of 1942, in the first months of 
America’s war with Japan, Americans of Japanese descent living on the 
nation’s Pacific Coast were subject to mass physical and constitutional 
displacement.157 The federal government adopted two forms of territorial 
displacement to deal with what it apparently believed to be a disloyal 
population. First, through a series of executive orders, followed later by 
congressional approval, persons of Japanese descent were excluded from 
areas near certain military assets.158 This displacement was based on the 
belief that the ancestry of those excluded made subversion and sabotage 
likely.159 The exclusion orders authorized officials to restrict the right of 
persons to enter, leave, or remain in the designated exclusion zones. 
Second, executive orders authorized mass evacuation and internment of 
persons of Japanese and other ancestries.160 The United States ultimately 
ordered some 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry to report to assembly 
 
 
 155. For a comprehensive examination of the courts’ treatment of racial segregation in the United 
States, see KLARMAN, supra note 142. 
 156. 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). 
 157. For accounts of the exclusion and internment policies and their effects, see ERIC L. MULLER, 
AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II 
(2007); GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE 
AMERICANS (2d ed. 2003).  
 158. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942). 
 159. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216–17 (1944) (noting national defense 
interests supporting exclusion orders). 
 160. See id. at 223–24 (upholding internment order). 
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centers, from which they would ultimately be transferred to ten internment 
camps located in the interior United States.161  
Although the displacement of persons of Japanese descent was 
officially predicated upon national security concerns, exclusion and 
internment demonstrated the perils of using territoriality as a weapon 
during times of war. First, territory was used as a blunt means of 
segregating persons deemed presumptively disloyal and dangerous.162 We 
now know that this presumption was based in part upon invidious racial 
prejudice.163 General Dewitt, one of the military commanders in charge of 
administering the internments, summarized the military’s insidious geo-
strategic objective: “[W]e must worry about the Japanese all the time until 
he is wiped off the map.”164  
Second, the effect of territorial exclusion and, in particular, internment 
was to banish Japanese Americans from their communities and to render 
them essentially invisible. Internment was a particularly harsh form of 
displacement, imposed without benefit of even minimal legal process. The 
internees, two-thirds of whom were American citizens, were transported 
from assembly centers on the West Coast to relocation centers.165 For two 
to as many as four years, internees were forced to live in barbed-wire-
enclosed camps.166 Military sentries patrolled camp perimeters. Internees 
bunked in horse stalls, tar-paper shacks and other makeshift 
accommodations.167 They endured horrible conditions, including “brutal 
heat and bitter cold, filth, dust and open sewers.”168 As a result of their 
displacement, the internees lost most or all of their possessions, as well as 
contacts with friends and neighbors in their communities.169  
 
 
 161. United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). 
 162. Exclusion and internment were used in other countries as well, to similar effect. See Mona 
Oikawa, Cartographies of Violence: Women, Memory, and the Subjects of the “Internment,” 15 CAN. 
J.L. & SOC’Y, No. 2, at 39, 40 (examining internment of Japanese Canadians).  
 163. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that 
government had withheld information regarding claim of military necessity and citing findings of 
racial prejudice by Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians).  
 164. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 12 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 
348 (2006). 
 165. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214, 223–24 (upholding orders to report to assembly centers). 
 166. For a poignant description of the internment camps, see MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: 
THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (University of Washington Press 1996) 
(1976). 
 167. Dinitia Smith, Photographs of an Episode That Lives in Infamy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at 
E1. 
 168. Id. 
 169. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE 
DENIED 2–3 (1982). 
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Constitutional challenges to both the exclusion and internment orders 
ultimately reached the Supreme Court. Although the Court acknowledged 
that heightened judicial scrutiny of the orders was warranted under the 
Equal Protection Clause (in light of the government’s explicit reliance on 
race), it ultimately deferred to the concerns of military authorities and 
upheld both the exclusion and internment orders.170  
Once again, the Constitution’s equality guarantee had failed to protect 
persons located within United States territory against an invidious form of 
racial-spatial segregation. Years later, of course, America came to look 
upon these particular constitutional displacements with a deep sense of 
national shame.171 Supreme Court precedents associated with the era, 
although never expressly overruled, have been largely discredited.172 As 
we shall see, however, six decades later territory would once again 
become a central means of defending the American homeland.  
3. Migration and Membership  
As noted in Part II, territorial sovereignty permits nations to set the 
basic rules for entry, presence, and citizenship. Prior to the 1870s, the 
United States had relatively open borders. This does not mean that state 
and federal laws imposed no barriers to immigration; rather, as 
immigration scholars have noted, what we now recognize as a system of 
immigration laws did not yet exist.173  
Not surprisingly, there have always been some restrictions on 
migration and territorial entry into the United States. Indeed, exclusionary 
legislation was expressly authorized under the Articles of Confederation, 
which denied “paupers, vagabonds and fugitives” the right to enter and 
leave the confederated states.174 Various migratory restrictions were 
imposed following ratification of the Constitution. For example, early state 
poor laws, modeled on British legislation, imposed internal restrictions on 
 
 
 170. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (upholding exclusion and internment orders); Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfews and exclusion order).  
 171. Later, it became clear that the internees posed no security risk whatsoever. See Korematsu v. 
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (overturning Korematsu’s conviction based in part 
on suppression of evidence). In 1988, Congress enacted a formal apology and provided for reparations 
of $20,000 to each survivor of internment or their heirs. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
383, 102 Stat. 904 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b (2000)).  
 172. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351–52 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting current validity of decisions upholding exclusion and internment orders). 
 173. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 19–20 (addressing what the author calls the “open-borders 
myth”).  
 174. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.  
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the territorial entry and migration of certain persons—paupers, convicts, 
freed Blacks, diseased persons, and other undesirables.175 Dumping of 
destitute persons by foreign countries was a particular concern.176 The 
courts initially upheld these state exclusions as valid exercises of local 
police powers; only later did the Supreme Court hold that these laws 
conflicted with Congress’s power to control foreign commerce and 
immigration.177  
Since the 1870s, Congress has held exclusive—and what is often 
referred to as “plenary” or absolute—power over immigration.178 Over the 
years, Congress has used that extraordinary power to selectively include 
and exclude aliens from various countries, generally without judicial 
oversight. Throughout the nation’s history, various groups have been 
subjected to territorial exclusions and expulsions based upon factors such 
as public disapproval, political unpopularity, homophobia, religious 
discrimination, and blatant racism.179 With regard to the latter, Congress 
used its plenary power over immigration to enact the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882, and before that the Page Law of 1875, and the Naturalization 
Act of 1870, which excluded the Chinese on racial, gender, and other 
invidious grounds.180 Territorial expulsions—deportations—have also 
been used to displace and detain persons residing (both legally and 
illegally) in the United States. During and particularly after World War I, 
communists who were resident aliens were subject to territorial isolation 
and expulsion. During the infamous Palmer Raids, thousands of suspected 
communists and anarchists were arrested and detained within the United 
States without trial.181 Offices and homes of more than 200 resident aliens 
were raided without warrants or probable cause; those seized were placed 
on board a ship bound for the Soviet Union.182 At various times in our 
nation’s history, territorial restrictions on ingress into and egress from the 
 
 
 175. See NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 21–40 (describing early 
state and federal “immigration” laws). 
 176. See id. at 23–29 (describing experiences in Massachusetts and New York with paupers). 
 177. See Cleveland, supra note 38, at 100–12 (discussing early immigration precedents).  
 178. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional 
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1998) (discussing “plenary power” doctrine).  
 179. Id. at 6–7.  
 180. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005) (examining Chinese immigration exclusions); see also ANDREW GYORY, 
CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT (1998). 
 181. See CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT: A HISTORY 
OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2007). 
 182. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 42–44 (1999). 
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United States have also been imposed on national security and ideological 
grounds.183  
Numeric quotas have also been used to determine eligibility for 
residence and citizenship in the United States.184 For example, in 1921 
Congress passed the Emergency Quota Act, which established national 
quotas on immigration based upon national origin.185 The quotas were 
based on the number of foreign-born residents of each nationality who 
were living within the United States as of the 1910 census. With passage 
of the Immigration Act of 1924,186 a more complex quota plan replaced 
this “emergency” system. Immigration quotas have been revised over the 
years, and are still enforced.187  
In sum, entry into the political community of the United States has 
always been determined with reference to territoriality—through the 
recognition and enforcement of national borders. Early in the nation’s 
history, when national territorial borders were generally open, states and 
localities filled gaps by excluding certain unwanted populations. Since the 
middle of the nineteenth century, Congress has occupied the territorial 
field relating to political membership. As bluntly described by Justice 
Frankfurter, judicial deference to Congress’s exercise of plenary power 
over territorial ingress and egress has been nearly complete: “[W]hether 
immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they have reflected 
xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the 
responsibility belongs to Congress.”188  
4. Early Urban Purification Measures  
State and local police powers have historically been used to isolate and 
exclude certain unwanted persons and marginal populations from 
particular places and territories. At least since Plato urged the banishment 
of beggars, officials have sought to expel beggars and homeless persons 
from public spaces.189 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
 
 
 183. Farber, supra note 115; see also Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of 
Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995).  
 184. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
NATIVISM, 1860–1925 (4th ed. 2002) (recounting political history surrounding adoption of quota 
system). 
 185. Pub. L. No. 5, 42 Stat. 5 (1921). 
 186. Pub. L. No. 139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). 
 187. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 202(a), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8 
U.S.C. § 1152 (2000)).  
 188. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 189. See II PLATO, LAWS, BOOK XI, at 465 (T.E. Page et al. eds., R.G. Bury trans., Harvard 
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centuries, isolation, quarantine, and other territorial measures were 
routinely enforced against the homeless.190 Homeless persons suspected of 
carrying smallpox were often detained, isolated for sometimes lengthy 
periods of time, and forcibly vaccinated.191  
Governmental attempts to cleanse or purify public places have taken 
broader forms as well. For example, the homeless and other vagrants have 
historically been displaced through enforcement of public order (vagrancy 
and anti-loitering) laws and discretionary police actions.192 The poor and 
homeless have not been the only unpopular groups subject to territorial 
purification measures. Prostitutes, drug addicts, and other marginalized 
persons have also been driven out of public places in order to cleanse them 
for general public use.193 The insane and the mentally ill have likewise 
historically been subjected to displacement measures, including 
involuntary commitment, institutionalization, and expulsion.194  
During the nineteenth and the better part of the twentieth centuries, 
legal protections from this form of territorial displacement were essentially 
non-existent.195 Due process was not robustly protected, and police 
operated with fairly wide discretion in public spaces. As a result, for a 
substantial time in our nation’s history local territories were largely under 
the discretionary control of the police and other local officials.196 In the 
name of public health and safety, local officials were empowered to create 
purified territories. 
After World War II, commentators and courts began to look with 
disfavor upon vagrancy and other laws that had been used to displace the 
homeless and other marginal persons.197 In the 1960s and 1970s, several 
courts invalidated vagrancy laws under the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on “Cruel and Unusual Punishments,” and the 
 
 
University Press 1961) (“There shall be no beggar in our State; . . . he shall be driven across the border 
by the country-stewards, to the end that the land may be wholly purged of such a creature.”). 
 190. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official 
Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons From American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 638–40 (1992) 
(discussing measures used to displace the homeless). 
 191. For a description of public health measures during this time, see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
 192. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972) (reviewing history of anti-
vagrancy laws targeting homeless). See generally LEONARD C. FELDMAN, CITIZENS WITHOUT 
SHELTER: HOMELESSNESS, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL EXCLUSION (2004). 
 193. Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 13–16. 
 194. See generally FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 117.  
 195. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 643–47 
(1956). 
 196. Simon, supra note 190, at 638–39. 
 197. Id. at 642 & n.71. 
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Due Process Clause.198 Other courts during this time invalidated vagrancy 
and loitering laws on the ground that they infringed liberties of travel or 
movement.199 In 1972, the Supreme Court condemned vagrancy and 
loitering laws as “archaic classifications”; in striking down Jacksonville, 
Florida’s vagrancy ordinance on due process grounds, the Court 
emphasized that such laws interfere with liberty of movement.200 As we 
shall see, local purification measures would take a different form in the 
1980s and 1990s. Although contemporary territorial displacements of 
vulnerable groups tend to be more subtle in form, the homeless and other 
marginal groups continue to experience substantial interference with basic 
liberties of public presence and movement. 
5. Controlling Contagion Territorially 
As discussed in Part II, preservation of public health and safety is a 
critical governance function of territoriality. The territorial measures of 
isolation and quarantine have deep historical roots.201 Indeed, as Michel 
Foucault has noted, one of government’s earliest uses of spatiality was as a 
means of separating healthy populations from those that were sick or 
infirm.202  
Nineteenth century state laws excluded, quarantined, and detained 
persons believed to be diseased and contagious at ports and other 
borders.203 In the early twentieth century, officials continued to segregate 
 
 
 198. See Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 62 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (invalidating criminal 
vagrancy law), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 907 n.29 (D. 
Colo. 1969) (holding that vagrancy statute invited selective enforcement and utilized unconstitutional 
classifications based on poverty); Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556, 560 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (same); see 
also Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D. Utah 1969) (finding vagrancy ordinance invalid under 
due process clause); Wheeler, 306 F. Supp. at 62 (holding that statute punished economic status 
without mens rea). 
 199. See, e.g., People v. Berck, 300 N.E.2d 411, 415 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that loitering statute 
violated Privileges and Immunities Clause by restricting free movement of citizens through state); 
Hayes v. Mun. Ct. of Okla. City, 487 P.2d 974, 979 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (invalidating nighttime 
wandering ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad on ground that it infringed liberty of movement); 
City of Portland v. James, 444 P.2d 554, 557–58 (Or. 1968) (invalidating loitering ordinance); see also 
Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D. Utah 1969) (finding that enforcement of ordinance would 
“certainly chill the liberty of lawful movement, presence and physical status”). 
 200. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161–62, 164 (1972). 
 201. See, e.g., Batlan, supra note 35, at 62–68 (discussing history of quarantine in United States). 
Isolation and quarantine are somewhat distinct measures. Isolation refers to the physical segregation of 
those diagnosed with a communicable disease. Quarantine is used to segregate healthy persons who 
are believed to be contagious. Ernest A. Abbott, Law, Federalism, the Constitution, and Control of 
Pandemic Flu, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 185, 195 (2008).  
 202. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 199.  
 203. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 31–34 (discussing early quarantine laws). 
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sick and contagious persons from the general public. The infected were 
sometimes physically confined to the home; at other times those believed 
to be a public health threat were confined in facilities or displaced to 
remote locations. In 1907, for example, New York officials forcibly (and 
famously) placed Mary Mallon—“Typhoid Mary”—in isolation for life on 
North Brother Island on New York’s East River to prevent the spread of 
typhoid fever.204  
Quarantines sometimes operated at the community-wide level. For 
example, at the turn of the twentieth century San Francisco imposed 
quarantine on all Chinese Americans after some persons of Chinese 
descent were found to have contracted the plague.205 Affected persons 
were not permitted to leave the Chinatown area for more than three 
months.206 Before and during this time, quarantine of vessels was also 
common at ports in the United States and across the globe.207 After the 
worldwide flu pandemic of 1918–1919, many state legislatures drew up 
detailed rules prohibiting all persons suspected of being infectious from 
going to certain public places—including schools, theaters, and stores.208 
During these early periods, the principle of public necessity generally 
provided the legal basis for isolation and quarantine orders.209 Owing 
generally to a lack of medical knowledge and expertise, courts were quite 
reluctant to second-guess the medical judgments underlying public health 
orders. So long as such orders were not arbitrary or unreasonable, they 
were generally upheld.210  
By the middle of the twentieth century, however, governments had 
begun to rely somewhat less on territorial displacement as a means of 
protecting public health. Scientific advances in diagnosis, treatment, and 
containment of disease allowed officials to use means other than 
 
 
 204. See JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, TYPHOID MARY (1996). 
 205. Batlan, supra note 35, at 105–06.  
 206. See Joan B. Trauner, The Chinese as Medical Scapegoats in San Francisco, 1870–1905, 57 
CALIFORNIA HISTORY 70 (1978). 
 207. Batlan, supra note 35, at 63–67. The Supreme Court upheld New York’s nineteenth century 
exclusion of paupers arriving by ship in the city’s port in Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 
102, 142 (1837), overruled in part by Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941). 
 208. See Richard J. Hatchett, Carter E. Mecher & Marc Lipsitch, Public Health Interventions and 
Epidemic Intensity During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic, 104 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 
7582 (2007), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/104/18/7582.full.pdf.  
 209. E.g., People v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815, 817 (Ill. 1922). 
 210. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccination 
of adults against smallpox). In addition, constitutional jurisprudence did not yet reflect robust 
protection for liberty and due process. The Bill of Rights had not yet been applied to state and local 
authorities. State constitutions also offered little protection, particularly in the face of widespread 
confusion, panic, and public hysteria.  
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widespread and lengthy quarantines. Courts were also beginning to more 
rigorously review the basis and breadth of public health orders. In the 
early 1950s, for example, tuberculosis patients mounted a successful 
challenge to a public quarantine order.211  
With the discovery of HIV and AIDS in the early 1980s, however, 
quarantine proposals resurfaced.212 With little objective and scientific 
knowledge about AIDS then available, some states enacted legislation 
empowering executives to impose even large-scale quarantines if they 
were deemed necessary to preserve the public health.213 As the incidence 
of AIDS rose, so did public hysteria. In the early 1980s, more than a 
quarter of the American public held the opinion that HIV-infected 
individuals should be quarantined.214  
In 1985, a New York state judge was incredulous that New York City 
health officials did not quarantine all HIV-infected adults.215 In 1986, 
Lyndon LaRouche placed Proposition 64, the “Prevent AIDS Now” 
Initiative, on the California ballot.216 The measure would have required 
statewide mandatory and reportable AIDS testing, banned anyone who 
tested positive or had AIDS from working at or attending schools or food-
handling occupations, and imposed quarantine on persons infected by the 
AIDS virus or ill with AIDS. Although Proposition 64 ultimately failed, 
several cities did move to close gay bathhouses, limit employment 
opportunities for AIDS patients, prohibit carriers from serving in the 
military, and suspend the rights of HIV-infected children to attend public 
schools.217  
Some public health efforts in the mid-1980s focused on regulation and 
displacement of populations at high risk for AIDS. In 1987, New York 
City officials placed a male prostitute who had been arrested sixty-six 
 
 
 211. See Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952). 
 212. Edward A. Fallone, Note, Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal to Quarantine 
Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 441 (1988); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Aids and 
Quarantine: The Revival of An Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1985); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
139 (1988).  
 213. See Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1281–83 
(1986) (discussing public health response to AIDS). 
 214. Id. at 1281. 
 215. Judge in AIDS Hearing Asks About Quarantine for Adults, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1985, at B7. 
 216. See Robert Steinbrook & Kevin Roderick, Medical Experts Assail Initiative on AIDS: 
Officials Dismiss Claims Made by Supporters of Larouche-Backed Prop. 64, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 
1986, at 3. 
 217. Note, supra note 213, at 1274; see also Steven H. Aden, A Tale of Two Cities in the Gay 
Rights Kulturkampf: Are the Federal Courts Presiding Over the Balkanization of America?, 35 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 295, 307 (2000).  
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times under a criminal quarantine order of indefinite duration.218 Similar 
orders were routinely issued against female prostitutes, on the ground that 
it was reasonably likely they were afflicted with some contagious 
condition.219  
The hysteria surrounding AIDS was also related to some degree to 
public and official attitudes regarding homosexuality.220 In such cases, 
purification and contagion were actually closely related. Displacement 
through quarantine signaled something beyond possible contagion. The 
territorial response to AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases indicated 
that both public health and individual morality were at issue. In sum, in 
these instances territory was used not only for physical security, but also 
as a type of normative communication regarding deviance.  
With regard to diseases like AIDS, scientific advances have lessened 
official resort to blunt territorial measures. But as we shall see, proposals 
to isolate and quarantine infected persons have now surfaced in response 
to threats of bioterrorism and highly resistant viruses. Territorial measures 
remain critical aspects of governmental planning for future epidemics and 
contagions.  
B. Five Contemporary Geographies of Displacement 
This part turns to several contemporary legal Geographies of 
Displacement, all of which are firmly rooted in the foregoing antecedents. 
Today’s public order and safety challenges—enemy aliens captured in the 
global war on terrorism, unauthorized (illegal) immigration, released sex 
offenders, persistent homelessness, and public health threats from more 
virulent strains of disease—have given rise to distinct and, in some cases, 
still-developing Geographies of Displacement. As discussed in the 
previous part, antecedent displacements—racial segregation, race-based 
internment, restrictions on local migration, some discretionary public 
policing measures, and use of large-scale quarantines as initial responses 
to contagion—have been largely condemned or criticized. But 
contemporary Geographies of Displacement have produced new questions 
regarding constitutional scope and exposed new threats to constitutional 
 
 
 218. Man Exposed to AIDS Put Under Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1987, at B4. 
 219. See, e.g., Ex parte Clemente, 215 P. 698 (Cal. 1923) (holding that quarantine of prostitute 
was justified on grounds of necessity); Ex parte Dayton, 199 P. 548 (Cal. 1921) (upholding jailing of 
woman pending examination owing to suspicion she was a prostitute).  
 220. SUSAN CRADDOCK, CITY OF PLAGUES: DISEASE, POVERTY, AND DEVIANCE IN SAN 
FRANCISCO 3 (2000) (observing that officials sometimes use their power to regulate disease to define 
deviance). 
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liberty. As we shall see, the Constitution speaks in rather uncertain terms 
regarding the government’s authority to create the contemporary 
Geographies of Displacement.  
1. The Geography of Justice 
Territoriality has been a critical element of the Bush administration’s 
prosecution of the global war on terrorism. In the name of national 
security—protecting the homeland—the administration has strategically 
constructed a unique Geography of Justice.221 Policies regarding the 
detention and treatment of persons labeled “enemy combatants” have been 
expressly premised on territorial displacement. Essentially, rather than 
intern detainees on United States soil, the government has sought to effect 
their territorial, legal, and constitutional displacement by detaining them 
beyond U.S. borders.  
Detention of enemy aliens at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is without 
question the most visible part of this new Geography of Justice. The Bush 
administration’s decision to hold detainees at Guantanamo was explicitly 
premised on the idea that the Constitution and laws of the United States do 
not apply outside U.S. territory.222 At least, the administration believed, 
constitutional guarantees of due process and habeas corpus would not 
extend to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  
There seemed to be both factual and legal support for this 
constitutional position. According to a lease agreement, Cuba retains 
“‘ultimate sovereignty’” with regard to the island.223 If, as earlier 
precedents had suggested, national borders were determinative of or 
defined national sovereignty, then detainees outside the United States 
would have no recourse to the Constitution.224 The Guantanamo Bay 
 
 
 221. See generally Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14 (discussing importance of 
territory in recent Supreme Court terrorism cases).  
 222. See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); see also JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006). 
 223. Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14, at 2540 (quoting lease, and discussing 
lease and U.S relationship to Guantanamo territory). 
 224. Previous wartime precedents appeared to support the administration’s position. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) (noting that habeas corpus protection did not apply 
to prisoners because “at no relevant time were [they] within any territory over which the United States 
is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States”). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 
S. Ct. 2229, 2257–58 (2008) (rejecting argument that Eisentrager established a formal territorial test 
regarding the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction).  
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Naval Base itself, however, has been under the “complete jurisdiction and 
control” of the United States since 1903.225  
In these somewhat ambiguous circumstances, the United States 
government brought prisoners to Guantanamo from Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
elsewhere around the world. It steadfastly insisted that the habeas statutes 
and the Constitution did not apply there because the United States was not 
sovereign in the territory.226 In essence, outside United States territory, the 
President asserted absolute legal dominion over suspected terrorists. 
Guantanamo was thus expressly conceived as a law-free zone; as one 
lawyer for the Bush administration suggested, it was “the legal equivalent 
of outer space.”227  
The question was thus whether, by simply placing 400 or so prisoners a 
mere 400 miles from the coast of the United States, the government could 
effectively make them disappear. Despite several legal setbacks, most 
notably those discussed immediately below in the Supreme Court, the 
United States government has been largely successful in denying the 
Guantanamo detainees access to justice and the benefits of the rule of law 
by territorially displacing them.228 The most important—and as yet not 
fully and finally answered—questions in the detainee litigation are 
expressly territorial: Where, precisely, does the writ of habeas corpus (and 
perhaps other constitutional guarantees) actually run? Can the United 
States avoid constitutional and other legal constraints and processes by 
holding detainees outside United States territory?229  
To fully appreciate the continued significance of territory in the fight 
against terrorism and more generally, let us briefly review the detainee 
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court. In Rasul v. Bush, the 
Supreme Court held that alien Guantanamo detainees captured in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan were entitled to statutory habeas corpus review 
 
 
 225. Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14, at 2540. The United States pays rent 
under the lease. Under its terms, Cuba could not terminate the agreement without U.S. consent. Id. at 
2537. 
 226. See id. at 2540 (“[T]he U.S. position was and remains that [Cuban sovereignty] disposes of 
any constitutional claims of the detainees.”). 
 227. John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 30 (quoting former 
Bush administration lawyer). The position that Guantanamo Bay was outside the sovereign control of 
the United States preceded the events of September 11, 2001. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252. 
 228. Only very recently have some detainees been granted access to judicial process and achieved 
some success in challenging their detentions. See William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five Detainees 
Held Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at A1. 
 229. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8 (analyzing recent habeas and detention cases); see also 
James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 497 (2006) (same). 
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under then-existing laws.230 Rejecting the basic premise of the Bush 
administration’s territorial strategy in the war on terrorism, Rasul held that 
control over the island territory was sufficient to support habeas 
jurisdiction over detainees’ claims.231 Rasul did not express any opinion, 
however, regarding whether habeas review was required under the 
Constitution, thus opening the door to future congressional restrictions.232 
The Rasul Court also declined to opine whether its habeas ruling extended 
to aliens held in territories in other places throughout the world.233 In these 
critical respects, the Court avoided the general question of the 
Constitution’s territorial scope. 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality found that the Executive had the 
authority to detain, without resort to criminal process, an American citizen 
captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan—first at Guantanamo and then 
later at American naval brigs.234 But the plurality also said that as a United 
States citizen, Hamdi was entitled to some form of due process regardless 
of location, and that the process used to determine Hamdi’s status as an 
“‘enemy combatant’” was constitutionally deficient.235 Thus, as a United 
States citizen, Hamdi was entitled to at least some minimal due process 
protections, including notice and an opportunity to rebut the government’s 
allegations before a neutral decision maker.236 At least with regard to 
American citizens and in certain limited terms, the Constitution appeared 
to follow the flag to Guantanamo Bay.  
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that an enemy alien detained at 
Guantanamo could not be tried under the Bush administration’s 
framework for military tribunals, as those tribunals failed to comply with 
international laws of war and procedures required under federal statutes 
for courts martial.237 Like Rasul, Hamdan rested largely on statutory 
 
 
 230. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 231. See id. at 481–82 (noting common law rule that habeas ran to territories under control of the 
Crown). 
 232. The Court did, however, hint at a constitutional habeas holding in a footnote. See id. at 483 
n.15.  
 233. Id. at 484. See generally Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial Constitution, 
62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 369 (2007) (discussing scope of Rasul decision); Elizabeth A. Wilson, 
The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edge”: Sovereignty, “Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the 
Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the Guantánamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165 
(2006) (same).  
 234. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 235. Id. at 510. 
 236. Id. at 533. 
 237. 548 U.S. 557, 670 (2006). 
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grounds.238 Thus, the Court once again avoided questions regarding the 
Constitution’s territorial scope or reach.  
Shortly after Hamdan was decided, Congress presented its own answer 
regarding territorial scope or jurisdiction. Overruling Rasul, the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006239 purported to strip federal courts of habeas 
jurisdiction to hear detention challenges by enemy aliens held at 
Guantanamo—and elsewhere outside United States territorial 
boundaries.240  
The issue was now at last joined: Assuming it had done so in the 
Military Commissions Act, could Congress and President Bush effectively 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus as to aliens detained at Guantanamo 
Bay? The Constitution permits suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
only “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion.”241 In a case involving several 
Guantanamo detainees who had been designated enemy combatants, the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that the Military Commissions Act 
stripped the federal courts of the statutory habeas jurisdiction that the 
Supreme Court had recognized in Rasul; the court further held that this 
denial of habeas review to Guantanamo detainees satisfied any 
constitutional requirements.242 The court’s constitutional holding was 
based on three basic propositions: (1) the Suspension Clause only protects 
the right of habeas as it existed in 1789, (2) the common law in 1789 did 
not provide any habeas right to aliens held by the government outside the 
sovereign’s territory, and (3) Guantanamo is outside United States 
territory for constitutional purposes.243  
The Bush Administration was once again rebuffed in the Supreme 
Court. While conceding that the scope of the Suspension Clause is limited, 
at a minimum, to its scope as of 1789 and that Guantanamo was located 
outside United States territory, the Court, in Boumediene v. Bush and Al 
Odah v. United States, nevertheless held that alien Guantanamo detainees 
are constitutionally entitled to pursue writs of habeas corpus.244 Writing 
 
 
 238. The Court held that the military commission violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 567. 
 239. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).  
 240. Id. § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635. The Act, which amends the earlier Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, allows detainees to challenge the fact of their detention, although not the conditions thereof, in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 2622.  
 241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Article I, Section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution provides that 
“[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Id. 
 242. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 243. Id. at 988–92. 
 244. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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for the majority, Justice Kennedy first determined that Congress had in 
fact suspended the writ of habeas corpus.245 After surveying the 
geographic scope of the writ as of 1789, Justice Kennedy announced that 
while “informative,” the history was not dispositive.246 The majority 
rejected the government’s core argument—that alien combatants held at 
Guantanamo were not entitled to the writ because Cuba, not the United 
States, was legally sovereign there.247 The Court stated that in discerning 
the geographic scope of the writ, it was appropriate “to inquire into the 
objective degree of control the Nation asserts over foreign territory.”248 As 
it had in Rasul, the Court noted that the United States exercises complete 
jurisdiction and control over the base at Guantanamo, and “maintains de 
facto sovereignty over this territory.”249 The majority interpreted Reid v. 
Covert,250 Johnson v. Eisentrager,251 and other precedents that had 
seemingly adopted a narrower and more formalist view of constitutional 
scope to support the proposition that the geographic scope of the writ 
ought to be based upon the particular circumstances and “practical 
necessities” of each case.252 
Eschewing a formal legal sovereignty test, Justice Kennedy announced 
a functional test for determining the geographic scope of the writ (and 
possibly other provisions in the Constitution).253 In addition to practical 
concerns relating to access to the writ, the Court held that three factors are 
relevant in determining the geographic scope of the writ: “(1) the 
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process 
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the 
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the 
writ.”254 Given that the status of the detainees in Boumediene and Al Odah 
was in dispute, there had been no trial by military commission, the United 
States exercised absolute and indefinite control over the naval base at 
Guantanamo, the detainees were isolated in a secure facility, and 
 
 
 245. Id. at 2244. 
 246. Id. at 2249. 
 247. Id. at 2252. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. at 2253. 
 250. 351 U.S. 487 (1956). 
 251. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 252. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255.  
 253. Id. at 2258 (“Nothing in Eisentrager says that de jure sovereignty is or has ever been the only 
relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas corpus.”). 
 254. Id. at 2259. 
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adjudication of the writ would cause no friction with Cuba itself, the Court 
held that the writ applied to the detainees.255  
Critical to the Court’s adoption of this multifaceted functional 
approach was the Bush administration’s attempted manipulation of 
territory and its effect on the constitutional separation of powers. In 
particular, the Court was concerned that permitting the government to 
avoid constitutional constraints through what amounted to creative leasing 
of territory would permit the “political branches to govern without legal 
constraint.”256 In the most poignant passage of his opinion, Justice 
Kennedy elaborated: 
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The 
Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to 
acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide 
when and where its terms apply. Even when the United States acts 
outside its borders, its powers are not “absolute and unlimited” but 
are subject “to such restrictions as are expressed in the 
Constitution.” Abstaining from questions involving formal 
sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To hold the 
political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or 
off at will is quite another. The former position reflects this Court’s 
recognition that certain matters requiring political judgments are 
best left to the political branches. The latter would permit a striking 
anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime 
in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say “what the 
law is.”257  
Exercising what it believed to be its judicial prerogative, the Court held 
that the Suspension Clause “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”258 It 
further held that the government had failed to provide an adequate 
substitute for habeas review.259  
As strong as the majority’s statements and convictions appear, the 
contours of the functional approach are far from clear.260 The decision is 
based to a large degree upon the unique status of Guantanamo and the 
 
 
 255. Id. at 2260–62. 
 256. Id. at 2259. 
 257. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 258. Id. at 2262. 
 259. Id. at 2274. 
 260. See Neuman, supra note 11 (discussing some of the important questions regarding 
constitutional scope left open by Boumediene). 
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United States’ de facto sovereignty over this territory. What about other 
territories and locations? Aliens detained by the executive outside United 
States territorial borders and in places not under exclusive and indefinite 
United States control would appear to remain beyond the geographic reach 
of the Suspension Clause.261 How much “control” is necessary to give rise 
to the writ? What specific constitutional rights do aliens detained in the 
covered territories and jurisdictions actually enjoy? What specific issues 
may they raise with regard to the conditions of their confinement?262 
Finally, what, if anything, does the Court’s opinion suggest with regard to 
constitutional provisions other than the Suspension Clause? Are these too 
now subject to the functional standard for determining geographic scope?  
Of course, Guantanamo is merely the most visible and contested 
evidence of the developing Geography of Justice. A limited number of 
detainees have been more radically displaced. Several reports have 
indicated that the Central Intelligence Agency has been operating secret 
detention facilities, or “black sites,” in various places throughout the 
world.263 In these facilities, persons are ghost detainees—literally the 
disappeared. As little as we know about treatment and process at 
Guantanamo Bay, we know even less about activities at these secret 
detention facilities. Certainly these special detainees have received no 
trials or other legal process. Given the lack of transparency and the 
seeming absence of any legal framework, the duration of detention is even 
more uncertain than it is for the Guantanamo detainees. Until they are 
released or moved to some more visible territory, these detainees remain 
outside the reach of the Constitution and the rule of law.  
Still other detainees have found themselves in law-free zones by virtue 
of a United States policy known as “extraordinary rendition.”264 Margaret 
Satterthwaite has defined this practice as “the transfer of an individual, 
without the benefit of a legal proceeding in which the individual can 
challenge the transfer, to a country where he or she is at risk of torture.”265 
 
 
 261. See Fallon & Metzger, supra note 8, at 2056.  
 262. See Paracha v. Bush, 374 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D.D.C. 2005) (raising treatment and other issues 
relating to detention).  
 263. See Stephen Grey & Doreen Carvajal, Secret Prisons in 2 Countries Held Qaeda Suspects, 
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at A12 (reporting confirmation of clandestine prisons in 
Romania and Poland); see also Mark Mazzetti & David S. Cloud, C.I.A. Held Qaeda Leader In Secret 
Prison for Months, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at A9.  
 264. Satterthwaite, supra note 13, at 1336. 
 265. Id. As one unnamed United States official bluntly explained: “We don’t kick the [expletive] 
out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them.” Dana Priest 
& Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used 
on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2001, at A1. 
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Under the rendition program, persons have been seized by CIA agents and 
other United States personnel and forcibly removed to other countries, 
where some claim to have been tortured. Owing to claims that trials would 
divulge state secrets or place national security at risk, no person subject to 
rendition has thus far been afforded an opportunity to obtain a remedy in 
the United States.266  
President Bush’s public remarks indicate that he believes current 
United States law authorizes rendition of suspected terrorists to territories 
abroad.267 Like detainees held in secret detention facilities, those rendered 
to another country’s territory for interrogation purposes have no habeas or 
other rights to judicial process.268 Certain treaties expressly prohibit the 
practice of rendition, at least without following certain safeguards.269 The 
Bush administration has taken the position that these treaties, like the 
Constitution itself, do not extend beyond the territorial boundaries of the 
United States.270  
Although practices like rendition are not entirely new, largely as a 
result of the United States’ war on terrorism a distinct Geography of 
Justice has recently been mapped through governmental manipulation of 
territory. The concept of the “homeland” is itself an integral part of a geo-
strategy for national defense. Guantanamo is a central element of that 
geographic strategy, but it is only one part. Territory has been strategically 
manipulated to create legal black holes and black sites. At the same time, 
the United States government has taken the position that it is empowered 
to detain some enemy combatants within United States borders 
indefinitely.271  
 
 
 266. A few rendered detainees have sought recourse in court after their release, but to no avail. 
See Adam Liptak, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Dismissal of Abuse Suit Against C.I.A., Saying Secrets 
Are At Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at A6; see also El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (dismissing German national’s claims against the CIA for injuries incurred during 
extraordinary rendition on grounds of state secrets privilege).  
 267. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Tribunals to Try 
Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/ 
20060906-3.html. The United States has not acted alone in making these detainees disappear. A recent 
report by the European Parliament concluded that many European governments cooperated, either 
passively or actively, in the U.S. rendition program. The report indicates that at least 1245 CIA-
operated flights passed through Europe’s airspace or stopped at its airports. Brian Knowlton, Report 
Rejects European Denial of C.I.A. Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006, at A15 (detailing European 
involvement).  
 268. Many treaties, some to which the United States is a signatory, prohibit torture and other 
mistreatment of detainees. Most of these are not self-executing and thus cannot be enforced in a court 
of law. Satterthwaite, supra note 13, at 1365 .  
 269. The treaties are discussed id. at 1350–79. 
 270. Id. at 1358–59. 
 271. A sharply divided Fourth Circuit recently held the government has the power to detain 
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The effect of all this territorial manipulation on individual liberty has 
been pronounced. Despite several Supreme Court rulings in their favor, 
detainees have been held for several years with minimal or no due process, 
limited access to counsel and other support, and subjected to indeterminate 
terms of isolation and confinement. Only recently has the Supreme Court 
directly addressed issues of constitutional scope and territoriality relating 
to these detentions. As noted, the ultimate effects the Court’s decisions 
may have on the contours of the Geography of Justice are not yet clear. 
The political branches are proceeding with military commission 
proceedings, a process that may drag on for several more years.272 And 
even in the event of an acquittal, it is far from certain that any former 
enemy combatant will actually be released.273  
2. The Geography of Membership  
As noted in Part II, geographic boundaries identify and designate 
sovereign territories. Sovereigns are of course entitled to regulate access to 
their territories and, with such access, rights to legal citizenship, 
membership in political communities, and access to certain benefits and 
privileges.274 Governments do this by drawing and, as necessary, re-
drawing territorial borders and boundaries.  
The manner in which a nation exercises this territorial power speaks in 
some sense to its commitment to openness and opportunity.275 Despite 
certain historical episodes of exclusion and expulsion, discussed earlier, 
the United States has generally taken great pride in the maintenance of 
relatively open borders. That commitment has been strained of late by 
controversy surrounding the presence of approximately twelve million 
illegal aliens within U.S. territory.276  
 
 
indefinitely a person lawfully resident in the United States, so long as sufficient process has been 
provided in determining his status as an enemy combatant. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted, 2008 WL 4326485.  
 272. William Glaberson, Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, at 
A19. 
 273. See Ross Tuttle, Comment, Rigged Trials at Gitmo, THE NATION, Mar. 10, 2008, at 4 
(suggesting possibility that no acquittals would be allowed and that detainees who were victorious 
would not be released). 
 274. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (discussing political membership and 
territorial borders). 
 275. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP (2006). 
 276. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 7, 2006), http://pewhispanic. 
org/reports/report.php?ReportID=61.  
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America has a complex and, at present, dysfunctional immigration 
system. Mexican and other immigrants continue to cross the border. 
Meanwhile, a volatile combination of economic uncertainty, racism, 
demagoguery, nationalism, partisanship, and legitimate concern for the 
rule of law has made illegal or undocumented immigration one of the most 
hotly contested political issues of the day. A deeply divided Congress has 
been able to accomplish next to nothing in terms of substantive 
immigration reform.277  
This failure to produce comprehensive reform has led to reliance on 
more blunt forms of territoriality. The most obvious example is 
congressional authorization for the construction of a massive fence along 
the nation’s 2100-mile southern border. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 
authorizes construction of the border fence—more than 300 miles of 
which have already been built—and appropriates $1.2 billion for an array 
of border protection measures.278 In addition to fence construction, the 
appropriated funds can also be used for vehicle barriers, lighting, and 
surveillance equipment (a virtual fence).279 Whether ultimately effective or 
not, the border fence will certainly be a potent symbol of territorial 
defense and exclusion.  
Although we tend to assume that legal borders are physically fixed by 
geography, this is not actually the case. Both federal and local laws 
expressly or functionally alter the location of the border. For example, by 
law and regulation federal immigration officials have established 
immigration borders within the United States. As Ayelet Shachar has 
explained, federal officials have legally shifted the location of the border, 
such that many aliens already within the country are treated as if they 
never crossed the cartographic border at all.280 More generally, several 
recent changes in immigration law and policy contract and extend the 
border in a manner that extinguishes rights (such as due process) that 
 
 
 277. The most recent legislative efforts in this regard faltered. See Randal C. Archibold, Bill Dies, 
Views Divide and Immigrants Work On, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A1 (describing fallout from 
Senate failure to advance immigration bill).  
 278. Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006). According to the Department of Homeland 
Security, Customs and Border Control, more than half of the 670 miles of fencing were completed as 
of June 2008. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, SBI 
Timeline (Nov. 10, 2008) http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/sbi/about_sbi/sbi_timeline. 
xml. For an updated map of construction, see http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/ 
highlights/fence_map.ctt/fence_map.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).  
 279. See Randal C. Archibold, 28-Mile Virtual Fence Is Rising Along the Border, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2007, at A12 (describing technological aspects of the Secure Border Initiative). 
 280. See Shachar, supra note 16, at 167 (referring to the “shifting border of immigration 
regulation”) (emphasis omitted). 
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would normally accrue to those physically present within United States 
territory.281 As Shachar notes, “the border itself has become a moving 
barrier, a legal construct that is not tightly fixed to territorial 
benchmarks.”282 In this instance, the malleability of the border imperils 
certain domestic individual liberties by de-spatializing them.  
Congress’s failure to produce a more systematic plan has also caused a 
proliferation of local territorial measures.283 In a certain sense, this has 
produced another inward movement of the country’s territorial borders. 
Increasingly, local communities are seeking to determine and adjudicate 
the lawfulness of presence within their own territories. According to the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, 240 laws relating to 
immigration were enacted by state legislatures in 2007—triple the number 
enacted in 2006.284 Many localities across the country have also enacted 
immigration measures in the past few years.285  
Many recently enacted state laws and local ordinances are somewhat 
reminiscent of early state exclusions of paupers, vagabonds, and other 
unwelcome persons. The specific use of territoriality has varied by 
locality. For example, some localities have threatened to enforce 
trespassing laws against illegal immigrants.286 Thus, the mere presence in 
the community of anyone without proper documentation would be deemed 
a criminal offense.287 Other localities, distressed that day laborers (many, 
if not most, of whom are presumed to be undocumented aliens) occupy 
parking lots, street corners, and other public places as they seek work, 
have sought to remove them through expulsion ordinances or official 
harassment.288 Street corners and parking lots may not seem worthy of this 
sort of effort and attention. To those who gather there, however, these 
places are critical to pursuit of livelihood and presence in the 
community.289 Indeed, expulsion from these local places makes it difficult 
 
 
 281. Id. at 169 (noting new distinction between “entry” and “admission,” expedited removal 
procedures, and collection of biometric information).  
 282. Id. at 167. See also Bosniak, supra note 55, at 403 (noting malleability of “the border”). 
 283. See generally Huntington, supra note 20 (examining local immigration measures and the 
intersection of local and federal authority in immigration context). 
 284. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT, 2007 ENACTED 
STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION (2008). 
 285. Huntington, supra note 20, at 803–04. 
 286. See Belluck, supra note 18. 
 287. Commentators have noted the increased reliance on criminal justice models in addressing 
immigration. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 288. See Fernanda Santos, Village Officials Harassed Day Laborers, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 2006, at B5 (invalidating policy of discriminatory treatment). 
 289. See Steven Greenhouse, On Dusty Corner, Laborers Band Together for More Pay, N.Y. 
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if not impossible for some to remain in the community at large. That, of 
course, may be precisely the point.  
Many states and localities have adopted broader territorial measures. 
These laws and ordinances are designed to prevent unlawful immigrants 
from being present in local communities and to restrict their access to 
local largesse.290 In general, these laws prohibit the employment and 
harboring of undocumented persons.291 Under hundreds of recently 
enacted state and local ordinances, landlords found to be renting space to 
improperly documented aliens typically may be fined; businesses found to 
be hiring illegal aliens may be penalized and possibly shut down; and legal 
employees may sue businesses for employment lost during any 
shutdown.292 These laws generally require business owners, landlords, and 
local officials to verify, at their substantial peril, the immigration status of 
all those seeking to live and work in the community.293  
These state and local laws are efforts to address problems purportedly 
related to illegal immigration, including higher crime rates and lower 
property values. The apparent hope is that by controlling access to places 
like residences and workplaces, local territories will become illegal-
immigrant-free zones. The nature and character of these local reforms 
raise the concern, however, that all aliens in the community will feel 
unwelcome and will perhaps be forced to move elsewhere.294 Employers 
and landlords—who are hardly expert at determining immigration status—
are now being called upon to make hiring and rental decisions that may 
disfavor aliens as a class. Constant official suspicion and surveillance may 
also inhibit even legal aliens from requesting services or appearing in 
public places.295 Meanwhile, the federal government has stepped up its 
own immigration enforcement efforts, conducting numerous well-
 
 
TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A1 (describing effort by day laborers to remain on corner in one community). 
 290. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 291. American Civil Liberties Union, Local Anti-Immigrant Ordinance Cases, http://www.aclu. 
org/immigrants/discrim/27848res20070105.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2008) (ACLU website 
collecting information on pending challenges). See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-18, supra note 21; 
Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13, supra note 21.  
 292. American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 291. 
 293. Id. 
 294. See Nina Bernstein, Promise of ID Cards is Followed by Peril of Arrest for Illegal 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at B1 (reporting effects of federal crackdown on immigrant 
community). 
 295. Responding to such concerns, localities like New Haven, Connecticut, have expressed a 
willingness to accept displaced aliens, without regard to citizenship status. Jennifer Medina, New 
Haven Welcomes Immigrants, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at B1. California, meanwhile, 
has prohibited localities from enacting territorial defense measures like those prevalent in other states. 
See Randal C. Archibold, State Strikes Balance on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A27.  
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publicized raids of homes and businesses.296 This has led to substantial 
disruption and fear in many communities across the United States.297  
Aliens, of course, have no constitutional right to enter the United 
States. As the Supreme Court has said, “[a]dmission of aliens to the 
United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign.”298 The Constitution 
does not expressly preclude a territorial lockdown. Thus, no alien may 
legally challenge the general militarization of the United States border, or 
demand membership in the political community.299 Nor, given the federal 
government’s plenary power over immigration, would it appear that 
challenges to agency alterations of the border have any real chance of 
success.300 (Of course, whether these measures are normatively attractive 
as aspects of the nation’s immigration policy is another question.)  
Recently enacted state and local immigration measures may have 
profound effects on the liberty of persons already present (some for many 
years) within the United States. The question is what sort of protection the 
Constitution affords to those who are subjected to these local territorial 
displacements.  
Thus far, threats to enforce trespass laws seem to have amounted to just 
that—mere threats. At this point, a few courts have addressed the 
constitutionality of recently adopted local territorial measures. In extreme 
cases, aggressive efforts to sweep unlawful residents from the streets, 
sidewalks and parking lots have been judicially condemned. For example, 
a group of laborers in one New York community successfully challenged 
their displacement from public territories under the Equal Protection 
Clause.301 Officials in that case were found to have aggressively targeted 
day laborers, many of them legal residents, for discriminatory treatment 
over the course of several months. The case is unusual in several respects, 
including the overwhelming evidence of systemic official harassment.302 
 
 
 296. Steven Greenhouse, Immigrant Crackdown Upends a Slaughterhouse’s Work Force, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A1. Federal officials have engaged in aggressive sweeps in “sanctuary” 
localities, arresting and deporting illegal residents. See Jennifer Medina, Arrests of 31 in U.S. Sweep 
Bring Fear in New Haven, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at B1. 
 297. See Samuel G. Freedman, Immigrants Find Solace After Storm of Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, July 
12, 2008, at A9 (reporting disruption and fear after immigration raids and arrests). 
 298. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
 299. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971) (regulation of aliens is “constitutionally 
entrusted to the Federal Government”).  
 300. Agency measures that define or alter internal borders are discussed infra Part IV.C.2. 
 301. Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that day 
laborers had demonstrated official campaign of police harassment).  
 302. Id. at 535–39 (describing systemic police harassment). 
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Subtler forms of official harassment—like frequent patrols and 
surveillance—are likely to go unchecked.303  
Day laborers have also successfully invoked the First Amendment in 
certain limited contexts. Insofar as access to traditional public forums like 
sidewalks and streets are concerned, the First Amendment provides 
limited protection against territorial displacement.304 Thus, for example, a 
Redondo Beach, California, ordinance that prohibited day laborers from 
soliciting work in most public places was invalidated on First Amendment 
grounds.305 Many less sweeping measures, including limits on location or 
place as opposed to outright prohibitions, would likely survive 
constitutional scrutiny.  
Thus, day laborers have enjoyed some limited successes in challenging 
local territorial displacements. But intentional and aggressive official 
harassment and sweeping bans on the public presence of day laborers are 
indeed exceptional. Contemporary territorial displacements are often far 
more subtle in form. In the ordinary case, courts must labor to bend and 
stretch the Constitution to address even something as fundamental as the 
right to be present in public places for the purposes of offering one’s labor 
to the public.306 The Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment are 
rather unwieldy tools for combating these and other local territorial 
displacements.  
More comprehensive local territorial reforms, including those that 
regulate employment of aliens, were recently called into question after a 
federal district court invalidated several Hazleton, Pennsylvania, 
ordinances.307 In the closely watched case, the court held that Hazleton’s 
housing and employment ordinances were preempted by federal laws.308 
 
 
 303. As well, unofficial acts of hostility as well as attitudes of neighbors and community members 
may establish territorial controls beyond the reach of the Constitution and laws. 
 304. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (describing 
standards for determining whether government has unconstitutionally excluded a speaker from a 
forum). 
 305. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952, 
966 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (invalidating ordinance banning street and sidewalk solicitation by day laborers 
on First Amendment grounds).  
 306. Moreover, these few reported victories mask some rather significant practical concerns. It is a 
particularly heavy burden for those with little means, little or no knowledge regarding the local justice 
system, and a general (and understandable) wariness of local authorities to challenge these sorts of 
territorial measures in the courts. In many cases, simply moving to another territory may be a far more 
attractive alternative.  
 307. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007). See Julia Preston, Judge 
Voids Ordinances on Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at A14 (describing decision as a 
“resounding legal blow” to local efforts to regulate immigration). 
 308. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519, 523, 529. For an analysis of preemption doctrine, see 
generally Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000). 
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The court also held that the ordinances failed to provide employers, 
employees, and landlords with adequate notice and opportunity for hearing 
prior to deprivation of their respective interests, in violation of the Due 
Process Clause.309 Specifically, the court held that the ordinances were 
vague with regard to what sort of documentation an employer or landlord 
must review, and an employee must provide, in order to comply with the 
law.310  
While it may appear to be a serious blow to local efforts to create 
undocumented-free zones, the Hazleton decision does not actually extend 
substantial constitutional protection to undocumented aliens in local 
communities. Although the district court noted on several occasions that 
illegal aliens were not stripped of all constitutional protections,311 this 
merely establishes constitutional jurisdiction; it does not establish the 
scope or substance of any liberties aliens might possess.312 The Hazleton 
decision rests primarily upon structural principles of preemption and 
federalism, rather than substantive liberty guarantees. Other courts, 
including the Supreme Court, may of course take a different view of the 
preemptive scope of federal employment and housing laws.313 Congress 
could also amend federal laws to provide localities with the necessary 
authority to address local employment and housing issues. As more and 
more immigration control devolves to the states, this is not as unlikely as it 
may once have seemed.314 As well, federal immigration enforcement raids 
may have the same general effect as laws like Hazleton’s—to flush out 
undocumented employees. Finally, insofar as the Hazleton decision rests 
on individual due process rights, the procedural infirmities identified by 
the court can easily be remedied.315  
Ultimately, nothing in the Hazleton court’s decision suggests that 
undocumented aliens have any right to be free from discriminatory 
 
 
 309. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536, 538. 
 310. Id. at 536. 
 311. Id. at 498–99, 514, 534. 
 312. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215–16 (1982) (noting fact that illegal aliens could claim the 
benefit of the Equal Protection Clause did not establish whether clause had in fact been violated). 
 313. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding state law regulating employment of 
illegal aliens). 
 314. See Huntington, supra note 20 (discussing federalism aspects of immigration law); see also 
Anil Kalhan, Immigration Enforcement and Federalism After September 11, 2001, in IMMIGRATION, 
INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Ariane 
d’Appollonia & Simon Reich eds., 2008).  
 315. This assumes that other courts will agree that illegal aliens have protected property interests 
in employment and rental properties. Although none of the cases relied upon by the district court 
involved rights of undocumented aliens, the court held that even illegal aliens have protected interests 
in their employment and rental agreements. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 533–34, 537–38.  
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enforcement measures, to avoid the stigma of disparately harmful laws, or 
otherwise to remain in a territory in which they are simply not wanted. 
Indeed, rejecting an equal protection challenge to the Hazleton ordinances, 
the district court held that the measures were “rationally related to the aim 
of limiting the social and public safety problems caused by the presence of 
people without legal authorization in the City.”316 Under the deferential 
rational basis standard, the city was not required to actually demonstrate 
any such effects—merely to allege them. Although immigrants won an 
important victory in the Hazleton case, courts in other jurisdictions have 
subsequently upheld similar measures aimed at punishing employers and 
property owners who extend offers of employment or residence to 
undocumented persons.317 Aliens thus cannot necessarily rely upon the 
Constitution’s structural division of authority or individual rights 
provisions to combat local displacements.  
The Geography of Membership is dynamic and is still taking shape. 
Unlike (most) enemy aliens, undocumented immigrants already reside 
within the physical territory of the United States. Unable to prevent their 
migration entirely, federal and local officials will likely continue to 
manipulate and regulate the territorial borders to effectuate exclusions and 
expulsions.318 Absent comprehensive reform, it is likely that a patchwork 
Geography of Membership will continue to develop across the country. 
Federal and local efforts to roust undocumented aliens from places of 
employment, residences, and public spaces will continue in many 
jurisdictions, with the Constitution barring only the most aggressive and 
harassing federal and local initiatives. Ultimately, many immigrants—both 
documented and undocumented—will either be displaced to sanctuary 
localities with less restrictive laws, or be forced to leave the country (in 
many cases after lengthy prison terms).  
3. The Geography of Punishment 
As reviled as suspected terrorists and undocumented aliens may be, 
today the group subject to the greatest public opprobrium—and perhaps 
the most substantial territorial and constitutional displacement—is 
 
 
 316. Id. at 542. Plaintiffs contended that the crime rate had actually fallen since immigrants began 
arriving in Hazleton. Id. at 542 n.69.  
 317. Julia Preston, In Reversal, Courts Uphold Local Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
2008, at A22. 
 318. See generally Shachar, supra note 16 (noting the dynamism and recent reshaping of U.S. 
territorial borders). 
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released sex offenders.319 Numerous states, cities, towns, and other local 
communities have recently imposed strict territorial controls on such 
persons in the name of public safety and health. These laws, which 
resemble early state exclusionary measures targeting convicted criminals, 
generally establish sex offender-free zones within states and localities.320 
Combined with certain less systematic displacements, discussed below, 
these laws are creating a new Geography of Punishment.321  
More than twenty states and hundreds of localities have recently 
adopted laws that prohibit convicted sex offenders from living, working, 
or even being present within a specified distance of various “anchor 
points”—schools, school bus stops, churches, playgrounds, day care 
centers, camps, parks, libraries, public swimming pools, gymnasiums, 
video arcades, theaters, convenience stores, and other places.322 The laws 
impose spatial restrictions of various sizes and dimensions. Sex offender-
free zones typically extend from 500 feet to 3000 feet beyond the 
designated public facilities, with many states opting for a 1000-foot buffer 
zone.323 A few states and localities have adopted a tiered approach under 
which high-risk offenders cannot live within 3000 feet of most anchor 
points, moderate-risk individuals cannot live with 2500 feet of such 
places, and low-risk offenders are subject to a 1000-foot exclusion zone.324 
In most states and localities, violation of the applicable zoning restrictions 
constitutes a felony.325  
The sex offender exclusion zones can produce severe physical and 
territorial displacements.326 Under the terms of some zoning measures, an 
 
 
 319. See ADAM SAMPSON, ACTS OF ABUSE: SEX OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
124 (1994) (noting public hatred of sex offenders). 
 320. See Logan, supra note 23, at 5–13 (describing residency exclusion laws). The sex offender 
exclusion laws are just one aspect of an extensive regulatory system for sex offenders. See generally 
ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE 
PREVENTIVE STATE (2006) (describing post-release sex offender restrictions).  
 321. Such laws are tolerated, in part, because they are not considered penal under constitutional 
standards. They are not, for example, considered by courts to be unconstitutional ex post facto 
punishments. Even if that is technically so, there is still a significant sense in which these laws punish 
convicted sex offenders by effectively displacing them from their homes and communities.  
 322. Logan, supra note 23, at 7.  
 323. Id.  
 324. Id. 
 325. Many of these laws and ordinances exclude sex offenders regardless of the specific 
circumstances of their crimes. Id. at 8.  
 326. Scholars have observed a similar phenomenon with regard to other convicted offenders. 
Beckett and Herbert have studied the use of off-limits laws and orders, including Stay Out of Drug 
Area (SODA) orders. Their data indicate that persons convicted of drug and prostitution offenses can 
be banned from large portions of cities under these orders. Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 13–14. 
The use of geographic exclusions has increased markedly in some cities. See id. at 15 (noting increase 
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offender is excluded or banished from entire cities—and in certain 
instances sizeable portions of entire states.327 In many instances, there is 
no individualized process for challenging one’s status and consequent 
displacement.328 Sex offender residency exclusion zones make it difficult 
or impossible for released offenders to remain in the community of their 
choice.  
In practical effect, sex offender exclusion laws may force offenders to 
live in remote areas with sparse populations, to cluster in certain 
neighborhoods, or simply to leave the state altogether. The most restrictive 
of these laws impose a form of modern-day banishment or “internal exile” 
through territoriality.329 The effects of such displacements have been quite 
severe for some released offenders. For example, a Miami-Dade County, 
Florida, exclusion law at one point forced five convicted sex offenders to 
live (with the county’s express permission) under a highway bridge.330  
Although they are the most comprehensive, territorial exclusion zones 
are not the only measures that have been implemented to control the 
presence, mobility, and behavior of sex offenders. For example, one town 
proposed housing sex offenders on a boat docked in a local marina.331 
Suffolk County, New York, officials at one point announced plans to put 
sex offenders in trailers that would then be moved about the county.332 The 
trailers were to be parked for several weeks at a time on public lands, 
some distance from residential areas. Not surprisingly, many local 
politicians were concerned about having these mobile sex offender trailers 
parked in their districts.333  
In addition, some courts have imposed territorial exclusions in 
individual criminal cases—either as punishment or as a condition of 
parole.334 Offenders have been ordered to stay out of a particular territory 
for as many as a dozen years.335 Local governmental officials have 
imposed other unique territorial exclusions. For example, local parks 
 
 
in Seattle drug cases of geographic conditions in probation cases—from 7.1% in 2001 to 30.1% in 
2005).  
 327. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706–07 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing effects of Iowa law). 
 328. Logan, supra note 23, at 14 (discussing lack of individual determination of dangerousness 
under Iowa exclusion law). 
 329. Yung, supra note 22, at 111 (describing effect of sex offender exclusions as “internal exile”). 
 330. Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A22. 
 331. Kilgannon, supra note 26. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. See Vesna Jaksic, A New Type of Sentence for Criminal Offenders: Exile, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 
10, 2007, available at http://www.nlj.com (noting recent increase in “banishment” or “exile” 
sentences). 
 335. Id. 
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officials in Lafayette, Indiana, banished a convicted sex offender for life 
from all city park properties, including community schools, city parks, 
golf courses, swimming pools, and sports stadiums.336 
The use of territory to control released sex offenders is part of a 
broader trend involving the spatialization of crime control.337 Prostitution-
free zones, gang-free zones, and drug dealer-free zones are also part of the 
developing Geography of Punishment.338 As noted earlier, many 
contemporary territorial measures are deeply rooted in early state laws 
excluding and displacing vagabonds, paupers, and other unwanted persons 
in an effort to purify urban spaces.339  
Although sex offender exclusion measures implicate a seemingly 
impressive array of constitutional provisions, to date they have proven 
mostly impervious to constitutional challenge.340 Doe v. Miller341 is the 
lead case involving the constitutionality of sex offender exclusion 
zones.342 Doe upheld an Iowa statute that prohibited convicted sex 
offenders from residing within two thousand feet of any school or child-
care facility.343 According to the lower court’s findings, the Iowa law 
severely limited the places where convicted offenders could legally 
reside.344 Released offenders were excluded from Des Moines and Iowa 
City, the two largest cities in the state.345 They were also excluded from 
many smaller towns and cities.346 Indeed, according to the district court, 
 
 
 336. See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding order). 
 337. Logan, supra note 23, at 11; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 
111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002) (examining various methods by which territory and architecture control 
crime). 
 338. Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for 
Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477 (1994); Peter M. Flanagan, Note, Trespass-Zoning: 
Ensuring Neighborhoods a Safer Future by Excluding Those with a Criminal Past, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 327 (2003); Sandra L. Moser, Comment, Anti-Prostitution Zones: Justifications for Abolition, 91 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1101 (2001); Robert L. Scharff, Note, An Analysis of Municipal Drug 
and Prostitution Exclusion Zones, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 321 (2005).  
 339. For an analysis of new forms of social control in urban places, including territorial exclusions 
of persons convicted of drug or prostitution offenses, see Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 13–15. 
 340. Several state appellate courts have upheld sex offender exclusion laws. See Boyd v. State, 
960 So. 2d 722 (Ala. 2006); ACLU of New Mexico v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-078, 139 
N.M. 761, 137 P.3d 1215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); Nasal v. Dover, 169 Ohio App. 3d 262, 2005-Ohio-
5584, 862 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).  
 341. 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 342. The Eighth Circuit applied the same analysis to Arkansas’s sex offender exclusion law in 
Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept., 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 343. Miller, 405 F.3d at 704–05. 
 344. See id. at 706–07 (discussing lower court findings with regard to the law’s displacing 
effects).  
 345. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 
2005). 
 346. Id. 
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offenders were essentially relegated to isolated rural or industrial areas 
within the state.347 Even in zones within the state that were not affected by 
the exclusion law, moreover, released offenders were not guaranteed 
available and affordable housing.348  
Plaintiffs pursued a host of constitutional claims, all of which were 
rejected. The Eighth Circuit held that the exclusion law was not 
unconstitutionally vague, even though it was difficult to identify the 
location of schools and child care facilities in many of the state’s 
communities.349 Nor, according to the court, were plaintiffs entitled to any 
sort of individualized determination of dangerousness prior to the 
residency exclusion going into effect.350 Under the Due Process Clause, 
the Iowa legislature was required to draw only a rational classification; the 
court was satisfied it had done so.351  
Adopting a narrow view of the Supreme Court’s precedents involving 
rights to associate with family members,352 the court held that the Iowa 
law did not “directly regulate the family relationship or prevent any family 
member from residing with a sex offender in a residence that is consistent 
with the statute.”353 If the offender was forced to move to a rural area, the 
court reasoned that the family unit could be preserved intact by having 
other family members move as well.354  
The court also rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the residency 
exclusion law violated rights to interstate travel or intrastate movement.355 
Sex offenders from outside the state, the court reasoned, were still free to 
move into Iowa so long as they abided by the residency exclusion.356 With 
regard to barriers to intrastate movement, the Eighth Circuit correctly 
noted that the Supreme Court has not expressly recognized any 
fundamental right to travel within a state.357 Although the court 
acknowledged that some circuits had indeed recognized such a right, it did 
not reach the question.358 It was sufficient, said the court, that the Iowa 
 
 
 347. Id. 
 348. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that unrestricted 
areas in Des Moines included “some of the city’s newest and most expensive neighborhoods”). 
 349. Id. at 708 (majority opinion). 
 350. Id. at 709. 
 351. Id. 
 352. See id. at 709–10 (discussing fundamental privacy rights). 
 353. Id. at 711. 
 354. Id.  
 355. Id. at 711–13. 
 356. Id. at 712. 
 357. Id.  
 358. See id. at 712–13 (discussing sister circuit rulings on right to intrastate travel). 
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residency exclusion imposed no direct barrier to intrastate movement—
even within the exclusion zones.359  
Noting the Supreme Court’s reluctance to interpret substantive due 
process expansively, the court summarily dismissed the argument that 
plaintiffs possessed a fundamental right to “live where [they] want.”360 
The court also held that the Iowa residency exclusions did not impose a 
retroactive punishment for offenses committed prior to the law’s 
enactment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.361 It specifically 
rejected the contention that the residency exclusion law was a form of 
“banishment” or punitive expulsion from the community.362 The court 
reasoned that the Iowa residency exclusion merely affected where an 
offender could reside within the zones; it did not banish or expel him from 
any excluded area.  
Less systematic, but no less burdensome, displacements on sex 
offenders have also been upheld. In Doe v. City of Lafayette,363 for 
example, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld an administrative 
parks department order that excluded a convicted sex offender 
permanently from all city park properties.364 The territory covered by the 
ban was substantial; it included a golf course, a zoo, a sports stadium, city 
pools, and several public parks.365 Doe was convicted of violating the 
order when he appeared at a public park and entertained “thoughts” about 
sexual contact with a group of older children there.366  
Doe brought several constitutional challenges to the order, all of which 
the Seventh Circuit rejected. Regarding his First Amendment claims, the 
court noted that Doe had not engaged in any expressive activity and was 
not using the parks for expressive purposes.367 Even if Doe had engaged in 
some form of expression, the court alternatively held, such expression 
constituted “incitement” and/or “obscenity,” and was thus not protected by 
the First Amendment.368 The court also rejected Doe’s argument that the 
 
 
 359. Id. at 713. 
 360. Id. at 713–14. 
 361. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Miller, 405 F.3d at 723. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ 
argument that the law violated their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See id. at 716. 
 362. Id. at 719–20. On the analogy between residency exclusion laws and banishment, see 
generally Yung, supra note 22.  
 363. 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 364. Id. at 774. 
 365. Id. at 760 & n.1. The order was entered without any notice whatever to Doe, and without any 
opportunity for him to contest it. Doe did not challenge the order on procedural due process grounds. 
 366. Id. at 760 (noting that Doe testified that although he was having sexual urges toward children 
the night he went to the park, “[t]hey were just thoughts”). 
 367. Id. at 763–64. 
 368. Id. at 764 n.7. These holdings are simply unsupportable on the facts. Doe had not displayed 
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order violated the First Amendment by excluding him from public places 
based solely on his private thoughts or beliefs369 (although in doing so it 
made repeated references to Doe’s status as a convicted sex offender and 
his apparent intention to interact with children at the park).370  
The Seventh Circuit also rejected Doe’s claim that the exclusion order 
violated his right to intrastate movement or travel. The court concluded 
that Doe was minimally burdened in terms of movement, as he was free to 
roam the community so long as he avoided all of the proscribed areas.371 
Finally, the court refused to recognize any fundamental right to enter the 
park properties simply to loiter or for other innocent purposes.372 The right 
to be present in a public park was not, said the court, “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”373 Finally, the court stated that the right to be 
present in public places was not fundamental to Doe’s “personhood.”374  
Released sex offenders have had some limited success challenging 
exclusion laws. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court recently 
invalidated that state’s sex offender residency exclusion law, which 
required that a registered sex offender move from his home or business 
any time a school, child care facility, or other anchor place was located 
within 1000 feet of the home or business.375 Under the law, offenders were 
forced to move from their homes even if a protected facility such as a 
daycare moved within a specified distance of the home long after the 
offender had taken up residence there.376 The court held that this form of 
territorial banishment amounted to an uncompensated regulatory taking in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.377 It reasoned that the residency-
 
 
any obscene or child pornography materials and was not engaged in any obscene conduct. See Osborne 
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). Nor did he incite imminent lawless action of any kind. In fact, he did not 
even speak to anyone. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (requiring advocacy of lawless 
action and likelihood it will occur).  
 369. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 765–67. 
 370. Id. at 758, 762, 763–64. 
 371. Id. at 770–71. 
 372. Id. Although no such right was claimed, the court first rejected any right “to enter parks to 
prey on children.” Id. at 770 n.11.  
 373. Id. at 770 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). The Court rejected 
Doe’s claim that he had a fundamental right to be in public for the purpose of loitering or loafing. But 
see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion) (noting that freedom to 
loiter is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 374. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 771. The court oddly reasoned that Doe’s claimed right to be 
present in the public parks could hardly be “fundamental,” given that he had last exercised it a decade 
or so prior to the order. Id. The court did not cite any authority for the proposition that one waives a 
liberty interest by failing to frequently exercise it. Id. 
 375. Mann v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 741 (Ga. 2007). 
 376. Id. at 742. 
 377. Id. at 745. 
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exclusion law acted as a physical ouster of plaintiff from his residence, 
extinguishing any investment-backed expectations.378 Of course, a ruling 
based on the Takings Clause does not prevent the state from enforcing its 
exclusion law and ousting the property owner in pursuit of some public 
purpose; the Takings Clause is a liability rule that merely requires the 
government pay fair market value for the property.  
Other territorial displacements of released sex offenders have not yet 
been challenged in the courts. It is not clear, for example, whether a 
county or municipality may confine sex offenders to houseboats or 
traveling mobile homes.379 Nor do we know whether the Miami-Dade 
County law, which effectively forced offenders to live under a bridge, 
meets constitutional requirements.380 With the exception of the somewhat 
anomalous and unique takings decision by the Georgia Supreme Court, 
however, precedent strongly suggests that extensive territorial 
displacements can be imposed upon sex offenders consistent with present 
interpretations of constitutional liberty. Internal exile is thus a very 
attractive option for policy makers faced with a population of released sex 
offenders.  
Sex offenders remain vulnerable to serious territorial and constitutional 
displacements. In addition to public laws enforcing territorial exclusions, 
some courts have also upheld private property arrangements like 
restrictive covenants, which similarly operate to exclude convicted 
offenders from entire communities.381 People convicted of a range of sex 
offenses may find it difficult indeed to choose their own place.  
4. The Geography of Purification  
Like the local immigration and sex offender-exclusion laws, 
contemporary efforts to purify public places by displacing or removing 
convicted drug offenders, the homeless, and other marginalized persons 
are also deeply rooted in our nation’s history.382 During the past two 
decades or so, a distinct Geography of Purification has developed in urban 
areas across America.383 This legal geography is grounded in urban 
 
 
 378. Id. at 744. 
 379. See Kilgannon, supra note 26. 
 380. See Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, supra note 24. 
 381. See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass’n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001) (upholding restrictive covenant barring sale to convicted sex offender). 
 382. See generally Simon, supra note 190 (discussing history of homelessness measures). 
 383. See Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 5 (“[I]t is clear that municipal governments across 
the United States are implementing new legal tools aimed at cleaning up contested urban spaces.”). 
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management principles and sociological theories which generally hold that 
controlling social disorder requires first controlling public places and 
territories.384  
Territoriality lies at the heart of many recent urban purification 
efforts.385 Some urban officials have relied upon concentration of the 
homeless in particular geographic areas like “Skid Rows.”386 These are 
merely quasi-territorial measures, however, since the homeless are not 
technically required to stay there. The principal territorial strategies, 
commonly pursued since the early 1990s, have been spatial dispersal and 
exclusion of the homeless and other unwanted populations from public 
places.387 In particular, public officials have imposed various limitations 
on where the destitute, homeless, and other marginalized persons can 
legally be, and what they can do in places they are permitted to occupy.388  
As homelessness, in particular, has persisted in many cities, officials 
have resorted to measures that ban and criminalize activities like sleeping, 
loitering, erecting structures, and asking for alms in public places.389 These 
measures became particularly prevalent in the early 1990s, as cities began 
to address what many then felt was intolerable disorder in public places.390 
Public officials like then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani of New York City 
implemented policies based on the “broken windows” theory of public 
order.391 The approach, advanced in a 1982 article in The Atlantic Monthly 
by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, was based on the premise that 
disorder and crime were inextricably linked.392 If a window in a building is 
not repaired, the basic theory holds, soon all of the windows in that 
building will be broken. And there goes the neighborhood.  
By analogy and extension, homeless persons, vagrants, and other 
marginalized individuals have been treated as broken windows. 
Controlling their location has become a critical strategy for preserving the 
safety and aesthetics of local neighborhood territories. As a result, begging 
 
 
 384. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2004) 
(discussing approaches to imposing order in urban spaces). 
 385. See generally Ellickson, supra note 30 (examining use of public places by the homelessness).  
 386. Id. at 1202; see id. at 1202–09 (describing origination and use of Skid Rows in urban areas). 
 387. Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 8–10. 
 388. Id. at 10–16 (describing recent innovations in urban social control, including use of trespass 
laws and “off limits” orders). 
 389. Id. at 8–9 (describing use of “broken windows” policing and civility laws).  
 390. See Ellickson, supra note 30, at 1167 (noting increased disorderliness by early 1990s).  
 391. See Mike Allen, Crackdown Turns the Village Quiet but Wary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1998, at 
A1 (discussing then-Mayor Giuliani’s focus on quality-of-life crimes and its repercussions). 
 392. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, 29–31. See generally KELLING & COLES, supra note 31. 
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and other public acts by the homeless are treated as symptoms of public 
disorder and public nuisance.393 To make communities and local territories 
safer and more palatable to the general public, beggars and other 
purportedly disruptive persons have often been systematically removed 
from certain locations.394 In some cities, ordinances prohibiting 
trespassing, loitering in certain public places, interference with pedestrian 
traffic, vagrancy, and disorderly conduct have been enforced in such a 
manner that the homeless are simply removed from certain territories 
altogether.395 In addition, territorial sweeps, innovative and aggressive use 
of trespass laws, enforcement of broad exclusion laws in public parks, and 
even changes to physical places and architectures have effectively created 
homeless-free zones in many cities.396  
One of the most common measures relied upon to regulate the 
homeless has been the adoption and enforcement of begging-free zones. 
Many local laws and ordinances ban appeals for assistance in various 
public areas including beaches, sidewalks near banks and sports stadiums, 
public places near tourist attractions, and areas near sidewalk cafes.397 
Some states and localities have enacted blanket bans prohibiting begging 
in all public places.398 Some states adhere to a common law rule that 
prohibits begging in any public place by any person who is “able to 
work.”399 Still other state and local laws prohibit “loitering for the purpose 
of begging” in any public place.400 Other measures prohibit “aggressive” 
 
 
 393. See Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 9 (noting prevalence of laws restricting “sitting or 
lying on sidewalks or in bus shelters, sleeping in parks and other public spaces, placing one’s personal 
possessions on public property for more than a short period of time, camping, urinating or drinking in 
public, selling newspapers and other written materials in public spaces, and begging.”). 
 394. See generally DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR 
PUBLIC SPACE (2003). 
 395. See Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 10–16 (describing effects of exclusionary laws). 
 396. See id. at 10–13 (discussing trespass and parks exclusion laws); see also MIKE DAVIS, CITY 
OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 235 (1990) (describing the “bum-proof” 
bench and other socio-spatial strategies used by Los Angeles officials). For a sociological account of 
how these limits are experienced, see MITCHELL DUNEIER, SIDEWALK (1999). 
 397. See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Laws Regulating Begging, Panhandling, or Similar 
Activity by Poor or Homeless Persons, 7 A.L.R. 5TH 455 (2006); see also NAT’L LAW CENTER ON 
HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, PUNISHING POVERTY: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS, 
LITIGATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOLUTIONS (May 2003), http://www.nlchp.org/content/ 
pubs/Punishing%20Poverty.pdf [hereinafter PUNISHING POVERTY]. The First Amendment implications 
of anti-begging laws are discussed in Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Commentary, Begging to 
Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896 (1991). 
 398. Laws and ordinances relating to homelessness are described in Bateman, supra note 397, § 2. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
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panhandling, which generally consists of following, harassing, or 
accosting others while making an appeal for assistance.401  
In some cities with increasing homeless populations, even these 
territorial measures have not been deemed adequately purifying. 
Responding to decades of frustration with an intractable homeless 
problem, Los Angeles officials enacted an ordinance described by a 
federal judge as “one of the most restrictive municipal laws regulating 
public spaces in the United States.”402 Section 41.18(d) of the Los Angeles 
Municipal Code provided: “No person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any 
street, sidewalk or other public way.”403 Violations of the ordinance were 
punishable by a fine of up to $1000 and/or imprisonment of up to six 
months.404 Public order laws typically limit infractions to situations in 
which the person actually obstructs a public way or engages in proscribed 
conduct during certain hours of the day.405 The Los Angeles ordinance was 
different, in part because it contained no such restrictions.406 Given its 
breadth, the ordinance effectively criminalized the public presence of 
thousands of homeless persons within the territory of Los Angeles.  
Localities continue to experiment with new ways to purify public 
places. Some have even criminalized feeding the homeless in certain 
public places, including parks. According to one advocate for the 
homeless, a Las Vegas ordinance makes it illegal “to offer so much as a 
biscuit to a poor person in a city park.”407 Other localities have enacted 
laws which limit the time, place, and manner of distributing meals to the 
homeless.408 Officials have indicated that they are concerned that 
congregating homeless populations will undermine expensive efforts to 
beautify public spaces.409 They also maintain that the intent of the laws is 
to encourage the homeless to visit social service organizations, rather than 
receive assistance in public areas.410 The effect in some localities, 
however, is to displace the homeless from places in which they regularly 
gather and receive basic assistance. 
 
 
 401. Id. § 3(b). 
 402. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 505 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 403. L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 1, § 41.18(d) (2005). 
 404. Id. 
 405. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1123 (describing laws in other jurisdictions). 
 406. Id. 
 407. Archibold, supra note 34. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. 
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What constitutional protection exists against these various forms of 
territorial purification? In light of the First Amendment, one might at least 
assume that the right of the homeless and other destitute persons to be in 
public places for the purpose of communicating with the public must be 
protected. Even this liberty, however, is far from certain. The primary 
message the homeless appear to be communicating is one of destitution 
and helplessness.411 Whether begging actually constitutes a form of 
protected expression has not been definitively answered. Some argue that 
panhandling is more akin to conduct constituting a public nuisance than 
expression.412 Others claim that begging is expression that lies at the core 
of several First Amendment concerns and values.413 Although the Supreme 
Court has recognized that organized charities enjoy expressive liberties, it 
has not yet opined on individual begging.414 Lower courts have disagreed 
regarding whether begging is entitled to First Amendment protection.415  
Even if panhandling or begging cannot be flatly banned, most beggar-
free zones are likely to satisfy the First Amendment. Targeted beach areas, 
spaces near sidewalk cafes and banks, public spaces near monuments, and 
other public places can often be purified consistent with current First 
Amendment standards. Under the time, place, and manner standard, 
localities can readily justify these measures as being related to public order 
and safety. So long as they constitute reasonably tailored regulations, 
courts are likely to uphold limited begging-free zones.416  
What of stricter purification enactments that ban sustenance activities 
like sleeping or resting in public places? Of course, no one has an absolute 
constitutional right to be in any particular public place or territory for any 
purpose. The Constitution does, however, impose minimal limits on the 
power of government to displace persons from public areas based solely 
upon their status. The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause has been interpreted to substantively limit what 
 
 
 411. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 397, at 913 (discussing message of panhandling). 
 412. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 30, at 1179–84 (discussing “chronic” panhandling). 
 413. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 397, at 913–15. 
 414. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec’y of 
State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for 
a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
 415. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 397, at 897 n.6 (discussing cases). The Second Circuit 
has actually taken both sides of this issue. Compare Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 
146, 156 (2d Cir. 1990) (describing begging as more conduct than speech and “a menace to the 
common good”), with Loper v. New York City Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(treating begging as protected expression).  
 416. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (noting that under the time, 
place, and manner doctrine, “perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of 
regulations that restrict expressive activity.”). 
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governments may criminalize.417 Specifically, the clause prohibits 
criminalization of conditions like disease, mental illness, or addiction.418 
Such “status” punishments are considered “cruel and unusual” under the 
Eighth Amendment because they penalize involuntary conditions rather 
than voluntary conduct. Voluntary actions, by contrast, can be 
criminalized. Thus, although alcoholism itself cannot be criminalized, the 
act of appearing in certain public places intoxicated can be punished.419 In 
sum, a person can be displaced—jailed, fined, or excluded—based upon 
what she does but not solely for who she is.  
Homelessness is somewhat problematic under this constitutional rubric. 
For one thing, there is disagreement regarding whether “the homeless” is 
even an accurate descriptor of any discrete population.420 Moreover, some 
are not convinced that homelessness is in fact a wholly involuntary 
status.421 Regardless, insofar as efforts to purify public places are 
concerned, governments may certainly regulate certain public acts 
engaged in by the homeless or those living on the streets. With regard to 
some such conduct—bathing, urinating, sleeping, and storing 
possessions—the truly homeless of course have no alternative place.422 An 
outright ban on any of these things is thus tantamount to a ban on public 
presence. In other words, there is a point at which the distinction between 
status and conduct seems ultimately to disappear. 
Notwithstanding the stark reality of laws criminalizing public presence 
and sustenance activities, some localities have successfully defended 
rather broad territorial displacements against Eighth Amendment 
challenges.423 According to the Ninth Circuit, however, Los Angeles 
simply went too far with its ordinance, described above, prohibiting 
homeless persons from simply being in certain public places.424 The court 
 
 
 417. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 418. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that status of drug addict 
could not be basis for criminal conviction). 
 419. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (plurality opinion) (upholding conviction for 
public drunkenness). 
 420. See Ellickson, supra note 30, at 1191–94 (distinguishing between the truly “homeless” and 
“street people”).  
 421. See id. at 1187 (disagreeing that the destitute generally lack choices with regard to where to 
eat and sleep, and stating that begging “is an option, not an inevitability”). 
 422. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 311 
(1991). 
 423. See, e.g., Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 851–53 (N.D. Cal. 
1994) (denying injunction with respect to enforcement of comprehensive homelessness program on 
Eighth Amendment grounds). But see Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 
1992) (holding that arresting homeless for harmless, involuntary conduct violates Eighth Amendment).  
 424. See supra notes 402–06 and accompanying text. 
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invalidated the ordinance on the ground that it punished the “status” of 
being homeless in violation of the Eighth Amendment.425  
A careful reading of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, however, shows that 
the homeless have no protected “right to the city.”426 First, the Ninth 
Circuit emphasized the plaintiffs’ “substantial showing” that they simply 
had no choice but to be on the streets owing to a lack of shelter beds.427 
Presumably, had shelter been available at the time of enforcement, and had 
plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of it, their displacement from public 
areas would have been constitutional. Thus, under the court’s 
interpretation, a person’s choice to remain on the streets rather than go to a 
shelter receives no constitutional protection.  
Second, what little protection the Ninth Circuit granted homeless 
persons to choose their own place may well lack solid support under 
controlling Eighth Amendment precedents. The Supreme Court has never 
held that conduct derivative of a person’s status cannot be criminalized.428 
As noted above, a person may be rendered homeless owing to a host of 
circumstances that have nothing to do with an involuntary condition. 
Additionally, part of what creates the condition in the first place is 
government’s failure to provide the necessary shelter. The Constitution, 
however, does not generally provide any remedy for the government’s 
failure to provide a benefit. Finally, homelessness is different from other 
conditions in that it may afflict a person intermittently. Those who are not 
permanently homeless may not qualify for protection under the Supreme 
Court’s status/conduct distinction. In sum, the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause does not provide any clear or robust protection for a 
right to be present in a public place.  
The most recent purification measures—those banning the feeding of 
indigent and homeless persons in public places—have not yet been fully 
tested in the courts. Classifications based upon indigence are subject to 
mere rationality review.429 As noted earlier, local officials argue that 
public order and health are best maintained when the homeless are served 
at facilities that offer more structured assistance—a purpose that generally 
would meet the deferential rationality standard. Some of the feeding laws 
 
 
 425. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 505 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 426. MITCHELL, supra note 394.  
 427. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136. 
 428. See, e.g., Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 855–57 (rejecting view that precedents protect acts 
“derivative” of homeless status).  
 429. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977) (upholding denial of Medicaid funds for two 
indigent women’s elective, non-therapeutic abortions under rational basis). 
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do not define “indigence” with sufficient specificity, which may leave the 
measures vulnerable to vagueness and other procedural challenges. The 
feeding bans also raise associational, assembly, and speech concerns. 
Assuming, however, that the definitional and coverage issues can be 
resolved, limits on the number of persons who may be fed, the specific 
location of the charitable activity, or the time of day in which it may take 
place may well be upheld against First Amendment and other 
constitutional challenges.  
The public presence and activities of homeless, destitute, and other 
marginalized persons are inconsistent with a vision of the purified public 
square. These individuals presently occupy precarious constitutional 
ground. The Constitution permits their substantial territorial displacement, 
subject to certain outer boundaries: a First Amendment concept of 
“expression” that may or may not include begging for assistance in public; 
an amorphous status/conduct distinction under the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause; and a less than robust liberty to 
receive charity in the public places of their choosing. 
5. The Geography of Contagion  
As noted in Part II, outbreaks of disease have historically given rise to 
territorial restrictions. Although there have been extraordinary medical 
advances in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there may be 
occasions in the near future in which territorial restrictions will be 
imposed upon persons infected (or believed to be infected) with 
communicable diseases.  
A bioterrorist attack or an outbreak of sudden acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS), avian flu, anthrax, smallpox, or multi-resistant strains 
of communicable diseases may require that governments consider 
imposing substantial restrictions on movement, public presence, and 
public activities. The two principal public health strategies used to combat 
contagion—isolation and quarantine—are explicitly territorial in nature.430 
Isolation is used for the demonstrably sick or infected. The person is 
placed under observation in a specific place and cannot leave until the 
isolation order is lifted.431 Quarantine is the compulsory sequestration of 
 
 
 430. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Are Traditional Public Health Strategies Consistent with 
Contemporary American Values?, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 175 (2004) (explaining quarantine, isolation, and 
other public health measures). 
 431. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 210 (2000). 
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groups of possibly exposed persons or confinement of such persons within 
certain geographic areas.432  
Isolation has been used on occasion to segregate infected individuals 
from the general public. For instance, a twenty-seven-year-old Phoenix 
resident was recently confined to a county jail cell for more than a year to 
protect the public from a resistant strain of tuberculosis.433 In a more 
prominently reported instance, a patient who traveled to Europe for his 
wedding (apparently against the advice of federal health officials) was 
subject to a federal isolation order upon his return.434  
There has not been a large-scale quarantine in the United States since 
the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, quarantine remains a likely 
response in the event of a modern public health emergency. Indeed, during 
some recent bioterrorism exercises, large-scale geographic quarantines 
were imposed by participating officials.435 The potential use of isolation 
and quarantine to protect public health and safety raises the prospect that a 
Geography of Contagion may develop.  
Territorial isolation and quarantine are sometimes necessary public 
health measures. Current federal and state laws provide officials with 
ample authority to isolate and quarantine individuals believed to be 
infected with, or to have been in contact with those infected with, a variety 
of communicable diseases.436 Under current federal laws and regulations, 
health officials have the authority to detain and examine any individual 
believed to be infected with a communicable disease and traveling to or 
from a foreign land or from one state to another.437 Federal health officials 
also have the authority to aid or enforce local quarantines in the event of a 
public health emergency.438 Violation of a federal quarantine order is a 
criminal misdemeanor, and courts are empowered to order injunctive relief 
to prevent such violations.439 
 
 
 432. Id. at 209–10. 
 433. Chris Kahn, TB Victim is Locked Up in Arizona, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 2, 2007, available 
at http://cbc.ca/health/story/2007/04/03/tuberculosis-prison.html (noting that Texas had placed 
seventeen people in isolation). 
 434. Lawrence K. Altman & John Schwartz, Near Misses Allowed Man with Tuberculosis to Fly 
to and from Europe, Health Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A13.  
 435. John D. Blum, Too Strange to be Just Fiction: Legal Lessons from a Bioterrorist Simulation, 
the Case of TOPOFF 2, 64 LA. L. REV. 905 (2004).  
 436. See generally ANGIE A. WELBORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE 
ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE AUTHORITY, REPORT FOR CONGRESS NO. 31333 (2005) (describing 
state and federal quarantine and isolation laws). 
 437. See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2000) (granting federal Centers for Disease Control authority to isolate, 
quarantine, and examine persons).  
 438. WELBORN, supra note 436. 
 439. Id. 
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Recently proposed federal homeland security plans and health agency 
regulations—the first proposed changes in federal quarantine authority in 
twenty-five years—would extend the government’s isolation and 
quarantine authority in the face of a public health threat.440 The Centers for 
Disease Control has proposed revisions to the federal quarantine 
regulations that would allow the government, under a procedure called 
“provisional quarantine,” to detain sick airline and other passengers for up 
to three business days without any administrative hearing.441 The 
regulations would also permit various forms of surveillance with regard to 
those considered at risk of infection, and would authorize the federal 
government to seize private property under certain circumstances.442  
Although they must generally yield to any conflicting federal laws and 
directives, state officials may also impose isolation and quarantine. State 
laws currently provide varying degrees of regulatory and judicial process 
for isolated and quarantined persons.443 Most of the laws have not received 
legislative attention in years; many are between forty and 100 years old. 
Some states are, however, beginning to reassess their quarantine and other 
public health laws.444 A Model State Emergency Health Powers Act was 
recently drafted by The Centers for Law and the Public’s Health at 
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities.445 The Model Act attempts 
to specify, among other things, appropriate limits on state use of 
quarantine and isolation.  
Territorial restrictions implemented as part of public health strategies 
may be quite substantial. In light of new and particularly virulent public 
health threats, even indefinite detentions are a possibility.446 As in the past, 
restrictions and public health orders may deny persons access to public 
places like movie theatres, transit stations, and schools. Borders may be 
closed to immigration and migration. Certain public gatherings may be 
banned. Households or entire neighborhoods may have to be quarantined 
 
 
 440. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 110–19 (describing proposed federal regulations). 
 441. See Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71892 (proposed Nov. 30, 2005) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71); Batlan, supra note 35, at 114 (describing “‘provisional quarantine’” 
procedure). 
 442. Batlan, supra note 35, at 111–14.  
 443. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious Disease 
Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59 (1999). For a fifty-state survey of state quarantine 
provisions, see TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION LAWS (2004), 
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror04/Quarantine.pdf. 
 444. Batlan, supra note 35, at 118. 
 445. CTRS. FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS 
ACT (Dec 21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf.  
 446. Batlan, supra note 35, at 117. 
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for weeks, perhaps even longer. Officials will likely feel pressured to act 
very quickly, and to retain spatial and geographic restrictions for as long 
as possible.447  
Like other territorial measures, isolation, detention, and quarantine may 
impact spatial liberties such as personal mobility, migration, public 
presence, and access to homes and other properties.448 Constitutional 
issues arising from these displacements will include due process 
requirements relating to detention, liberties of interstate and intrastate 
travel, rights of association and privacy,449 equal protection, and rights to 
compensation for any condemned properties.450 
Constitutional limitations on isolation and quarantine have not been 
rigorously analyzed by scholars or tested in the courts. Undoubtedly, the 
federal and state governments have very broad authority under the 
Constitution and health and welfare statutes to respond to public health 
threats. Particularly in an emergency situation, state and federal authorities 
would have wide latitude to impose isolation, detention, and quarantine on 
affected persons and populations.451  
Broad challenges based upon lack of constitutional or statutory 
authority would likely be unsuccessful, particularly during a public health 
emergency. The general standard with regard to public health emergencies 
remains Justice Holmes’s early-twentieth-century formulation, which 
requires merely that public health laws not be “unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
oppressive.”452 Of course, much has occurred since this standard was 
announced, including the judicial recognition of fundamental 
constitutional rights to privacy and liberty as well as remarkable advances 
in medicine and science. Broadly speaking, these developments will 
provide some gloss on reasonableness. History demonstrates, however, 
 
 
 447. According to a recent study of public health responses to the 1918 influenza pandemic in the 
United States, the earlier officials lock down public territories, and the longer they keep restrictions in 
place, the lower the death count. See Hatchett, Mecher & Lipsitch, supra note 208, at 7584 (reporting 
results of analysis of 1918 influenza pandemic). 
 448. Batlan, supra note 35, at 112. 
 449. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (noting rights of “intimate 
association” like family); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488–90 (1960) (invalidating statute 
requiring disclosure of organizational memberships). Proposed federal plans and regulations would 
likely result in increased surveillance activities relating to such things as passenger screening. Batlan, 
supra note 35, at 112.  
 450. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring “just compensation” for takings). 
 451. See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 
539 (2007) (examining operation of Takings Clause and other constitutional provisions in 
emergencies). 
 452. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). 
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that protection against territorial and some forms of constitutional 
displacement wanes considerably during public health emergencies.453  
In more specific terms, the process due in the event of forcible 
detainments and isolations will likely depend upon the process feasible—
which may be rudimentary in an emergency involving an unknown or 
rapidly evolving threat.454 In an emergency, governments will likely be 
permitted to detain and isolate individuals without a hearing for several 
days while the threat is assessed. A several-day detention order, with some 
avenue provided for administrative appeal, would probably satisfy 
constitutional due process requirements. Detention and other forms of 
displacement beyond such a limited time frame would obviously raise 
more serious concerns. At the least, assuming legal institutions are open 
and operating, habeas corpus review must be made available to those 
subject to isolation or quarantine orders.455  
Isolation and quarantine orders may impact mobility—sometimes 
severely. As noted earlier in the context of sex offender laws, courts are 
divided as to whether there is any fundamental right to intrastate mobility 
or travel.456 Even if a court were to recognize such a right, an isolation or 
quarantine order would likely survive judicial scrutiny. The interest in 
preserving public health would likely be deemed compelling. The 
government would also likely be given substantial leeway in tailoring the 
territorial restrictions of any quarantine order. With regard to broader 
travel rights, the Supreme Court has indicated that the right to foreign 
travel can be restricted where it would threaten the public health.457 Of 
course, some safeguards must be in place to ensure that evacuation, 
quarantine, and isolation orders can be altered, in terms of time and 
geographic area, as circumstances change and information is gathered. 
Lengthy isolations and broad quarantines would also interfere with 
associational liberties, such as the right to live with family members. In 
sum, governments would have to ensure that these displacements were 
tailored to the emergency.  
As antecedent quarantines of Asian Americans, prostitutes, and AIDS 
carriers have shown, officials can be particularly insensitive to equality 
 
 
 453. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 119 (noting substantial deference courts have given to 
authorities during past epidemics).  
 454. See id. at 117 (questioning whether procedures contemplated under federal plans and 
proposed regulations would be sustainable in the event of an outbreak). 
 455. See id. at 116 (noting that proposed rules provide for habeas corpus challenges). 
 456. See supra notes 357–58 and accompanying text. 
 457. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (upholding limits on right to travel abroad). 
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concerns during public health emergencies.458 The temptation to use race 
or ethnicity as proxies for infection may be quite high. Quarantine for 
avian flu victims, for example, may target or disparately impact Asian 
Americans.459 Written standards and other measures should be in place to 
protect persons who are infected—or are from places affected by a 
bioterrorist attack or pandemic—from discrimination by officials and 
health care providers. Given the concern with stigmatic harms arising from 
displacement, authorities ought to pay particular attention to the manner in 
which spatial segregation and quarantine are imposed.460 Controls and 
preventive measures are critical in light of the fact that absent invidious 
intent, territorial displacements that disparately affect certain minorities or 
classes will likely withstand equal protection and other constitutional 
challenges.461  
Finally, some properties, including homes and businesses, may have to 
be condemned and destroyed in the event of a pandemic or bioterrorist 
attack. Assuming a public health necessity, no compensation would likely 
be required under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.462 In some 
cases properties may also have to be monitored for continuing threats to 
public safety. Access to homes may be denied for extended periods of 
time. Assuming, again, the presence of an actual public health emergency, 
none of these measures would likely require that compensation be paid to 
the property owner or lessee.  
Like the other legal geographies discussed in this part, a Geography of 
Contagion, which will be based principally upon territorial isolation and 
quarantine, will raise substantial liberty concerns. The Constitution will 
not cease to apply or operate within this specific geography. Neither, 
however, will it likely prevent substantial territorial displacements from 
being enacted and enforced. 
 
 
 458. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 60 (“[I]n the past, quarantines have been infused with issues of 
race, class, and gender placing the greatest hardships on those who failed to conform to white middle-
class norms of behavior.”). 
 459. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: 
An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 
104 (1997) (noting danger of discriminatory treatment during public health emergencies).  
 460. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 60 (noting stigmatic effects of past quarantines). 
 461. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (absent proof of discriminatory intent, a 
generally applicable law with disparate effects does not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 462. Prevention of harm or nuisance has been considered to negate the compensation requirement. 
See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485–93 (1987); Goldblatt 
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT 589 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT AND SPATIAL GAPS  
As Part III demonstrated, territorial displacements implicate an 
expansive array of constitutional provisions—the limitation on suspension 
of habeas corpus,463 the Equal Protection Clause,464 the Due Process 
Clause,465 the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause,466 the Privileges or Immunities Clause,467 the Ex Post Facto Clause 
and Bill of Attainder Clause,468 the Takings Clause,469 and the First 
Amendment.470 Protection against certain territorial displacements may 
also be found in constitutional structures like the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, the citizenship principles of Article IV and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause.471  
Nevertheless, as we have seen protection against territorial and 
corresponding constitutional displacements remains rather thin, 
particularly with respect to certain disfavored persons and groups. As the 
antecedent and contemporary displacements discussed in Part III show, the 
Constitution contains some rather significant extra-territorial and intra-
territorial spatial gaps. Legal Geographies of Displacement take root in 
these fissures, with serious and, in some cases, continuing effects on 
personal liberty. Although we cannot close these spatial gaps entirely, this 
final Part examines the general process of constitutional gap closure and 
suggests several avenues toward at least narrowing some of our 
contemporary gaps. To better understand why such measures are 
necessary, however, we must first take full measure of the scope and effect 
of the constitutional displacement brought about by territorial laws and 
tactics.  
A. Constitutional Displacement 
In a world in which borders are sometimes said to be less and less 
relevant, territory remains critical to both governance and constitutional 
liberty. Territorial displacement continues to be an expedient 
governmental response to real and, in some cases, merely perceived 
 
 
 463. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 464. Id. amend. XIV. 
 465. Id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV. 
 466. Id. amend. VIII. 
 467. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 468. Id. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. 
 469. Id. amend. V. 
 470. Id. amend. I. 
 471. Id. art. IV, § 2; id. amend. XIV; id. art. VI, § 2. 
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societal threats. From the perspective of lawmakers, territorial 
displacement is often a viable and even attractive option, in part because 
the displaced lack any effective political representation. It is no mere 
coincidence that from Jim Crow to Guantanamo, legal and constitutional 
displacements have been imposed on persons already in some sense alien 
to and displaced from the Constitution’s protective orbit. 
Many of the territorial displacements discussed in Part III came about 
as a result of public fear and demonization—of, for example, African 
Americans during Jim Crow, aliens and the foreign-born during wartime, 
and the diseased during periods of scientific uncertainty. Cyclical 
economic downturns seem always to increase public awareness of and 
focus upon migrants and immigrants, who officials then seek to remove or 
displace owing to their alleged connection to depressed wages, 
unemployment, and other social ills. As demonstrated by early state 
migratory exclusion laws, criminals—including most recently the derided 
class of released sex offenders—have always been targets of territorial 
displacement. The urge to banish and displace them, through 
imprisonment or other means, has always been strong. The poor, as well, 
have historically engendered a substantial degree of public antipathy; 
displacement has been used to situate them out of public sight and mind.  
Although the specific means of displacement have changed, the general 
pattern of displacement has been remarkably consistent over time. Nothing 
as blunt and sweeping as what David Delaney described as the “hyper-
territoriality” of racial segregation presently exists.472 But new, more 
subtle, methods of displacement have arisen which similarly diminish or 
exterminate constitutional protections for certain purportedly troublesome 
populations. Contemporary lines are often more narrowly drawn to 
exclude or expel; but they are often no less effective at displacing persons 
and groups. Individuals and groups subjected to racial segregation, 
internment, territorial expulsion, “internal exile,”473 purification, and 
isolation have been treated as if they exist somewhere beyond the 
Constitution’s domain. As we have seen, the effects of territoriality on 
constitutional liberty can be quite severe.  
Fundamental physical liberties are, of course, substantially affected by 
territorial restrictions. The displaced are denied—by legal and physical 
barriers and sometimes force—the liberty to choose their own place. For 
example, the territoriality of racial segregation denied black citizens the 
 
 
 472. DELANEY, supra note 141, at 96. 
 473. Yung, supra note 22, at 111.  
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right to occupy the same territory on an equal basis with white citizens. 
Internment of Japanese Americans, involuntary confinement of the 
destitute, sick, and mentally ill, and extended quarantines of those believed 
to be contagious all denied people the most basic liberty—to be free from 
physical restraints unless and until due process is provided. Today, 
detention at Guantanamo Bay and other less visible sites of displacement 
affect the same fundamental liberty. Restrictions on migration, whether by 
citizens or aliens, also affect freedoms of mobility and inter-territorial 
movement. Residency exclusions for sex offenders may preclude both 
locomotion and presence in chosen communities. Urban purification 
measures affect the basic liberty to be present in designated public places, 
and the right to choose one’s own place.  
We have seen that existing constitutional concepts, doctrines, and 
modes of reasoning do a rather poor job of capturing the breadth and depth 
of harms associated with territorial displacement. Narrow legalistic 
conceptions of liberty—freedom of movement or freedom from physical 
restraint—tend to focus mostly on displacement’s effects on the body. But 
the harms associated with the territorial displacements examined in this 
Article extend well beyond such physical effects.474 In addition to their 
basic physical effects, each of the Geographies of Displacement discussed 
in Part III limits the most fundamental of personal choices: where and with 
whom to live; where and how to work; where one may recreate; which, if 
any, institutions of justice are available; and even which acts of basic 
sustenance one may perform in a public place.  
Territorial displacements also have a substantial communicative 
element. As noted earlier, for decades courts turned a blind eye to the 
symbolic or communicative aspect of systematic racial-spatial 
segregation—in particular, the deep stigma that accompanied displacement 
on racial grounds. Racial segregation was harmful not merely because of 
its severe effects on the body—the denial of freedom of movement and 
limits on physical presence—but because of what it indicated with respect 
to African Americans’ personhood and dignity.475 Territorial 
displacements such as racial segregation, internment, and even quarantine 
 
 
 474. We must not, however, minimize those effects. In some instances, it is not an overstatement 
to say that the right to exist is at stake. As Jeremy Waldron has observed, urban purification measures 
affect not only constitutional liberties like the right to beg, but interests that are “basic to the 
sustenance of a decent or healthy life, in some cases basic to the sustenance of life itself.” Waldron, 
supra note 422, at 320 (emphasis added). 
 475. For an insightful discussion of race and dignity, see Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race 
Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669 (2005). 
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have all communicated something negative with regard to personal status, 
worth, and belonging.476  
Ouster from a territory also entails denial of membership in a 
community. To be cast out of a territory is to be denied a measure of one’s 
personhood. The geographer Don Mitchell treats the harm caused by 
displacement of the homeless owing to urban purification as a form of 
social delegitimization.477 Mitchell’s discussion of the homeless accurately 
conveys the type and degree of harm visited upon many other displaced 
persons as well. Measures that segregate, exclude, expel, and isolate 
territorially often brand persons as inferior.478 Displaced persons are not 
only physically, but also symbolically, cast out of various geographies and 
places: entire continents, states, communities, workplaces, residences, 
streets, public parks, and even local parking lots. The intent, if not the 
actual effect, is to cause their physical, legal, and juridical disappearance. 
As noted in Part III, the Constitution, as presently interpreted, often fails to 
account for these deeper effects of territoriality.  
Finally, as we have seen, territorial restrictions tend to cast a rather 
wide net insofar as constitutional liberties are concerned. Exile, 
internment, and detention often affect a range of fundamental liberties—
freedom of association, freedom of expression and assembly, access to the 
courts, and pursuit of a calling or profession. Spatial liberties thus cannot 
be assessed in isolation; they are often necessary prerequisites for the 
enjoyment of a variety of constitutional liberties.479 In this sense, as well, 
liberties of place are constitutive of full personhood. In sum, territoriality’s 
effects on constitutional liberty are often far deeper and more severe than 
traditional constitutional analysis recognizes.  
These effects are often magnified where governments operate in 
response to crises and emergencies. As the discussion of antecedent and 
contemporary displacements in Part III showed, territorial displacement is 
often imposed in response to troubling economic, social, and political 
events. The fact that territorial displacement tends to be associated with 
what we might call “emergency governance”—official acts taken during 
times of war and social strife—may help explain the diminished 
constitutional protection sometimes granted to those displaced.480 But this 
 
 
 476. See, e.g., Batlan, supra note 35, at 60 (noting stigmatic effect of quarantines). 
 477. See MITCHELL, supra note 394, at 136–37. 
 478. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 199. 
 479. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 2 (noting primacy of place to First 
Amendment freedoms). 
 480. See generally Meyler, supra note 451 (discussing emergency governance). 
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is only a partial explanation. As demonstrated in Part III and explained 
below, constitutional displacement is only possible owing to the presence 
of substantial spatial gaps in constitutional structures and rights 
provisions. 
B. External and Internal Spatial Gaps  
As we have seen, the Constitution has been successfully invoked in 
certain instances to combat particular territorial displacements. In the 
main, however, the constitutional tools for dealing with territorial 
displacement are either absent or rather ill-suited to the task. The 
Constitution contains what we might refer to, and conceptualize as, spatial 
gaps.  
As explained in Part II, the Framers of the Constitution were acutely 
sensitive to certain spatial matters. Indeed, in some respects, they were 
masters of geo-strategy. Thus, for example, the Framers provided clear 
spatial directives concerning the importance of territory to matters such as 
sovereignty, internal governance, and defense.481 They were far less clear, 
however, with regard to the importance of territory to constitutional scope 
and individual liberties. Fashioned without the “prolixity of a legal code,” 
the Constitution leaves many critical spatial and territorial issues 
unresolved.482 Moreover, the Framers acted at a time when cartographic 
borders were generally considered to be fixed—matters of brute, as 
opposed to social and political, fact. As a result of these and other factors, 
the Framers bequeathed to future generations a variety of vexatious extra-
territorial and intra-territorial spatial gaps.  
The Constitution’s extra-territorial gaps have been widely noted and 
commented upon, including in the recent group of Guantanamo detention 
cases.483 The issue is fundamentally one of constitutional scope or domain. 
As noted in Part II, the Framers did not speak with a clear voice with 
regard to whether the Constitution “follows the flag” when the United 
States acts beyond its territorial borders.484 As Gerald Neuman has 
observed: “Defining the domain of constitutionalism has major practical 
implications for immigration policy, the conduct of foreign affairs, 
military action, and the participation of American citizens in an 
 
 
 481. See, e.g., supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 482. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 200 (1819). 
 483. See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 39; Cleveland, supra note 38; Louis Henkin, The Constitution 
as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
11, 23–24 (1985); Kent, supra note 38; Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14. 
 484. RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?, supra note 14. 
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increasingly global society.”485 The geographies of justice and 
membership, in particular, bear this out.  
There are myriad positions with regard to constitutional scope or 
domain. At one extreme, scholars argue that the Constitution’s limitations 
“appear to apply to the national government, regardless of where, and 
against whom, it acts.”486 But other scholars and commentators reject 
universal application of the Bill of Rights; they deny that the Constitution 
follows the flag to any territory outside United States borders.487 Still 
others stake out a middle ground, arguing that some, but not all, 
constitutional guarantees apply outside our borders.488 The Supreme Court 
has not definitively settled the matter of the Constitution’s geographic 
domain—even as to United States citizens.489 As a result of this 
uncertainty, persons detained or otherwise subject to United States 
authority abroad cannot be sure of the scope or extent of their 
constitutional liberties.  
This lack of clarity with regard to constitutional scope or domain has 
created certain incentives and opportunities for governmental 
manipulation of territory. Thus, for example, in recent years the Bush 
administration has simultaneously argued both that displacement of enemy 
aliens to Guantanamo Bay extinguishes constitutional liberties and that 
mere presence of an enemy alien on United States soil does not itself 
guarantee any basic constitutional liberties.490  
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court appeared to reject a narrowly 
territorial definition of constitutional domain.491 The Court applied a 
functional standard for determining the geographic scope of the 
 
 
 485. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 3. 
 486. Cleveland, supra note 38, at 19. See LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 99–100 (1990) (arguing that Bill of Rights embodied a “universal human rights 
ideology”).  
 487. See Kent, supra note 38 (making textual and historical arguments against universal 
application of constitutional rights).  
 488. As Gerald Neuman observes, courts and scholars have adopted several theoretical approaches 
to constitutional scope. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 5–8 (discussing universalism, membership, 
mutuality, and global due process approaches). 
 489. See id. at 93–94 (noting lack of consensus on Court); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. 1032 (1984) (majority of the Court assumed that illegal aliens who enter United States territory 
have Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding 
that Fourth Amendment did not apply to search of Mexican residence of Mexican citizen who had no 
voluntary attachment to the United States); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 
(1904) (holding that excludable alien is not entitled to First Amendment rights).  
 490. With regard to the latter position, see Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(per curiam), cert. granted, 2008 WL 4326485. 
 491. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
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Suspension Clause.492 Under that test, territory still matters—but only as 
one of several factors, including a range of “practical” considerations 
associated with extending the domain of habeas corpus.493 While this 
narrows the territorial gap somewhat, it is difficult to tell just how much 
and, as noted earlier, with regard to which specific constitutional 
guarantees.494 The Constitution’s extra-territorial gaps will undoubtedly be 
the subject of future litigation—by aliens and detainees located both 
abroad and within the United States. If Boumediene’s functional approach 
is any indication, we shall likely continue to see the Constitution’s domain 
decided in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion. 
In considering the Constitution as a unique spatial framework, less 
noted intra-territorial gaps also become readily apparent. For example, the 
constitutional status of aliens located within United States territory has 
always been somewhat uncertain. Presence within certain territories, such 
as states, explicitly entitles all persons to certain liberties.495 But as we 
have seen, presence on United States soil is not the brute fact the Framers 
appear to have assumed it to be. As well, with very few exceptions—
notably that of the home—the Framers’ conception of liberty related 
primarily to persons rather than places.496  
Although they obviously contemplated that persons would migrate 
from territory to territory, the Framers failed to elaborate with any 
precision the parameters of one’s right to mobility or migration. Nor did 
they articulate any fundamental right to public presence. Indeed, the 
Constitution very nearly failed to mention public places at all.497 And it 
does not, of course, contain any explicit recognition of human dignity or 
personhood. As a result of these omissions, those who are displaced 
through territorial exclusion, internal exile, purification, isolation, and 
quarantine often fall squarely within some of the Constitution’s internal 
spatial gaps.  
My primary goals have been to highlight the critical intersection of 
territory and constitutional liberty and, in particular, to demonstrate the 
many ways in which territoriality restricts or denies certain liberties. This 
Article does not offer any grand gap-closing constitutional method or 
theory. But once we recognize the dangers constitutional displacement 
 
 
 492. Id. at 2259 (articulating several important factors).  
 493. Id. 
 494. See generally Neuman, supra note 11 (discussing the issues left undecided by Boumediene). 
 495. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (granting certain liberties to all “persons” within a state). 
 496. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. 
 497. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
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poses to liberty and liberal democracy, the next logical step is to begin to 
think about how we might narrow the Constitution’s spatial gaps. The 
final part of the Article offers some general ideas in pursuit of this limited 
goal.  
C. Narrowing or Closing Constitutional Gaps 
Before briefly addressing some narrowing suggestions, we should note 
that history contains important lessons regarding what might be considered 
the process by which the Constitution’s spatial gaps are narrowed or 
closed. Among other things, the course of the antecedent displacements 
discussed in Part III shows that we cannot look solely, or even primarily, 
to the courts in seeking to fill external and internal spatial gaps.  
As the courses of racial territoriality and Japanese internment (to take 
just two examples) show, gap narrowing or closure is a complex legal, 
social, and political process. While judicial decisions have certainly been 
catalysts in this process, social and political forces have arguably been as, 
or more, significant in extending liberty and constitutional personhood to 
the previously displaced. In particular, the passage of time—and with it, 
the emergency or perceived threat—and marked changes in societal 
attitudes have been essential elements of prior spatial gap closings. In 
some instances, notably racial segregation and internment, the nation has 
come to regret territorial and constitutional displacements. Once the 
purported emergency has passed, polities have reconsidered the morality 
and effectiveness of displacement. In the case of World War II 
internments, actual remedial measures were adopted, although well after 
the fact.  
While gap closure or narrowing can often be a lengthy and involved 
social, political, and constitutional process, there are steps we can take to 
encourage and hasten the filling of some of the more prominent spatial 
gaps in constitutional coverage. In short, because of territory’s connection 
to fundamental liberties and the substantial harm that attends its 
manipulation by government, we ought to de-emphasize territory abroad 
and re-emphasize it in various domestic contexts.  
1. De-Spatializing Justice  
The Framers drafted a constitutional framework that incorporated a 
particular conception of cartographic borders. Those borders were 
primarily, although not exclusively, necessary to support claims of 
sovereign status on behalf of the new nation. In a pre-globalized world, 
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cartographic borders were self-evident. At least, they were apparent 
enough to make physical presence within the states and the United States 
(and its territories) determinative of rights and status in some limited 
circumstances. The Framers did not, of course, map territorial boundaries 
for all time and purposes.498 But neither did they foresee the ease with 
which those boundaries could be manipulated. Initially through physical 
expansion (empire-building), and more recently as a result of 
globalization, it has fallen to the Framers’ “posterity” to resolve pressing 
questions of constitutional domain.499  
As noted in Part II, the Framers did not make a clear choice among 
“territorial,” “universal,” or other approaches to constitutional domain or 
scope.500 Courts and scholars have struggled with issues of constitutional 
domain for decades, with no position gaining universal acceptance. 
Questions of whether and, if so, to what extent constitutional liberties 
extend to persons located in territories outside the United States’ borders 
are far too complex to be fully engaged in this Article. But certain lessons 
regarding constitutional gap narrowing or closure and the de-spatialization 
of justice can be gleaned from the legal, moral, and political battles 
relating to Guantanamo Bay and other war-on-terror displacements.  
For some time now, there has been general support in the legal 
academy for closing Guantanamo’s constitutional “loophole.”501 Some of 
this movement relates to rejection of the narrow territorial conception of 
the Constitution’s domain.502 Beyond this, however, the war on terrorism 
has demonstrated to many that the spatialization of justice is inconsistent 
with basic social, legal, and moral precepts. Professor Kal Raustiala has 
argued that “legal spatiality”—the notion that constitutional liberty varies 
with location—“is at odds with contemporary concepts of jurisdiction, 
with the intensifying trend of globalization, and with our most cherished 
principles of constitutionalism.”503 As Professor Raustiala demonstrates, 
territorial sovereignty has been gradually eroding across various legal and 
 
 
 498. For example, new states may be admitted to the union. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 499. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 500. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 5–8 (discussing four prominent approaches to constitutional 
domain).  
 501. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 50 (2004) 
(arguing against power to manipulate physical location in order to exploit right-less territories); Owen 
Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 252 (2006).  
 502. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 483, at 23–24 (arguing for a universalist approach). The 
literature on universalism is summarized in Kent, supra note 38, at 481–84.  
 503. Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14, at 2504.  
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political fronts. As a result, he says, “where one sits does not necessarily 
determine what legal rules one sits under.”504  
Still, as Professor Raustiala also notes, “the federal courts continue to 
cling to the notion that American law is tethered to territory—that simply 
by moving an individual around in space, the rights that individual enjoys 
wax and wane.”505 It is not only courts, but executive and legislative 
officials, who continue to cling to the spatialization of justice. 
Guantanamo, black sites, and the practice of rendition are all examples of 
a legal spatiality firmly rooted in the territorial conception of 
constitutional scope.  
The pressure that had been building in the courts for some time to 
squarely address hyper-spatialization of the rule of law reached a 
crescendo in Boumediene. There the Court, in the face of a blatant attempt 
by the executive and legislative branches to not merely regulate but 
manipulate territory, partially de-spatialized constitutional liberty by 
granting geographically distant detainees a right of access to the courts.506 
In effect, the Court narrowed one significant spatial gap in constitutional 
domain—access to habeas corpus.  
Owing to the considerable complications that would attend outright 
globalization of all constitutional rights, including demands for such rights 
by wartime detainees captured and detained in places other than 
Guantanamo, it should come as no surprise that the Boumediene Court did 
not simply adopt a universalist interpretation of constitutional domain. But 
the Court’s functional approach to territory and constitutional scope may 
turn out to be quite significant in terms of extending constitutional liberty 
to those detained outside the United States. The Court made it clear that 
blatant territorial manipulation by the executive and legislative branches 
would not be tolerated. As discussed in Part III, it adopted an objective 
approach that asks, among other things, whether the United States 
exercises “effective control” over a territory.507 Whether this approach 
extends the rule of law to territories other than Guantanamo Bay remains 
to be determined.  
The Court has not acted in isolation, of course. Extra-judicial aspects of 
constitutional gap narrowing have also been at work. In particular, the 
 
 
 504. Id. at 2512.  
 505. Id. at 2504. See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to search of property in foreign country belonging to nonresident 
alien); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (limiting 
habeas rights to U.S. territory). 
 506. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 229. 
 507. Id. at 2244. 
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passage of time and constant reporting on topics such as detainee 
treatment, torture, and legal process, may have caused some decline in 
public support for the Guantanamo detention scheme (as well, it should be 
noted, for the more aggressive aspects of the war on terrorism).508 Broader 
shifts in political and societal attitudes, both in the United States and 
abroad, also appear to be occurring. Supreme Court decisions rejecting 
various aspects of the Bush administration’s territorialism strategy have 
likely been catalysts in this regard. But in a larger sense, this is a matter of 
stepping back from contemporary legal spatiality and reflecting on its 
morality and its consistency with national values.  
Although it may not have initially been readily apparent to many, 
spatialization of detainee rights shares a historical lineage with the 
spatialization of race. As Sarah Cleveland has noted, the present-day logic 
of extra-territorial detention is rooted in “a peculiarly unattractive, late-
nineteenth-century nationalist and racist view of American society and 
federal power.”509 Professor Cleveland is referring in particular to the 
rationale for the Insular Cases, which refused to extend full constitutional 
protections to some U.S. territories based largely on the view that the 
inhabitants of those territories were not sufficiently “civilized.”510 Like 
those cases, the developing Geography of Justice, including the 
Guantanamo detention system, is based upon justifications that often 
“parade as enumerated text without any recognition either of the 
international law origins of the principles or the racist, illiberal ideology 
on which they are based.”511 Gerald Neuman has stated the matter more 
bluntly: “Maintaining [the detainees] as rightless outlaws because of their 
captive status revives the logic of slavery . . . .”512  
Assuming we have collectively rejected territorial manipulation as a 
national defense, it may indeed be possible, as one anti-universalist 
commentator suggests, for alien detainees and those rendered to other 
territories to be protected “by diplomacy, treaties, the law of nations 
(today’s customary international law), and nonconstitutional policy 
choices of the political branches.”513 Treaties and diplomacy will only 
 
 
 508. During the recent presidential election, President-elect Obama pledged to close Guantanamo 
Bay and condemned U.S. torture of detainees. James Traub, Is (His) Biography (Our) Destiny?, N.Y. 
TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 4, 2007, at 650.  
 509. Cleveland, supra note 38, at 14. 
 510. Id. at 219. 
 511. Id. at 278. 
 512. Neuman, supra note 501, at 50. 
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work, of course, if American officials agree to be bound by these 
processes.514  
Of course, the most direct way to close the Guantanamo loophole, and 
thus to narrow the extra-territorial gap in which it sits, is for the executive 
branch to voluntarily close it. As this Article was going to print, President 
Obama issued executive orders indicating his intention to close the prison 
at Guantanamo Bay within a year and to end the program of secret 
detentions for enemy combatants..515 In a relatively short span of time, one 
of the Constitution’s territorial gaps has been substantially narrowed. In 
historical terms, the pace of this particular aspect of the de-spatialization 
of justice has been remarkably rapid. Still, it remains to be seen whether 
the pressures associated with fighting terrorism will lead to other forms of 
displacement during the present administration. One of the most important 
questions, yet unanswered, is the extent to which constitutional domain 
will be interpreted in future cases to extend outside United States 
territorial boundaries. As others have noted, however it occurs, the de-
spatialization of justice for “enemy combatants” and others detained under 
United States policies and authority would be welcome. As Owen Fiss has 
observed, “it must be remembered that the issue is not just the survival of 
the nation—of course the United States will survive—but rather the terms 
of survival.”516  
2. The Spatialization of Domestic Liberty 
The responses to the Constitution’s extra-territorial gaps show that gap 
narrowing or closure is a product of political, social, and legal forces. The 
same is true of the various responses to the Constitution’s internal spatial 
gaps—those that affect what we might call domestic spatial liberties. 
Within our (cartographic) borders, certain persons fall within spatial gaps 
in constitutional protection. Given the variety of interests at stake, 
including those of undocumented aliens, sex offenders, the destitute, and 
the sick, narrowing these spatial gaps is in many respects a more 
complicated endeavor than narrowing the gaps arising from a strictly 
territorial conception of the Constitution’s domain.  
 
 
 514. See Satterthwaite, supra note 13, at 1400 (noting how Bush Administration has avoided 
treaty limits on rendition).  
 515. See Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down 
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, A1.  
 516. Fiss, supra note 501, at 256. 
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Here, again, we ought to remember that even the most pernicious 
territorial abuses in our history—racial segregation and internment—
ultimately took many decades to address and were not resolved by courts 
alone. In the interim, however, certain spatial adjustments may serve to 
narrow some of the Constitution’s internal gaps. Briefly, these gap-
narrowing measures consist of (1) increased oversight regarding the 
official manipulation of United States borders; (2) recognition of limited, 
implicit spatial liberty interests; (3) more careful attention to and 
application of the Constitution’s spatial structure, especially its federalism 
aspects; and (4) constitutional theory-building that begins to incorporate 
notions of territorial disadvantage. Each of these aspects of what should 
obviously be considered a rudimentary spatialization agenda is discussed 
briefly in this final part. 
There is one particular context in which the Constitution’s extra-
territorial and intra-territorial gaps intersect. Owing to the territorial 
conception of constitutional domain, the legal mapping of geographic 
borders can be determinative of access to fundamental liberties like due 
process and equality. But as Ayelet Shachar has recently noted, the “legal 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion” no longer correlate neatly with 
U.S. “cartographic” borders.517 Recent legal and policy changes at the 
federal level have altered the location of the nation’s borders, “at times 
penetrating into the interior, in other circumstances extending beyond the 
edge of the territory.”518  
For purposes of determining legal admission, Congress has stated that 
the territorial border is not fixed but is to be “designated by the Attorney 
General.”519 By replacing fixed and static borders with dynamic and 
moveable ones, policymakers can often manipulate the border in a manner 
“that best suits the goal of restricting access.”520 In certain instances, this 
means that even those aliens who are physically present within the United 
States will be treated as if they never entered; as a result, even minimal 
rights of due process and equality explicitly granted by the Constitution to 
those on United States soil will not apply.521  
Whatever its flaws, at least the formalistic territorial approach granted 
aliens a degree of certainty with regard to basic constitutional liberties. In 
 
 
 517. Shachar, supra note 16, at 166. See also LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS (Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006). 
 518. Shachar, supra note 16, at 166. 
 519. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2000). 
 520. Shachar, supra note 16, at 167. 
 521. See id. at 171 (comparing physical act of “entry” to evolving legal concept of “admission”). 
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more general terms, as Linda Bosniak has argued, political and communal 
membership are properly treated as matters of social fact rather than legal 
formality.522 What Bosniak calls “ethical territoriality”—the idea that 
liberties and recognition ought to extend to all persons within a particular 
territory—is, as she says, more consistent with “the egalitarian and anti-
caste commitments to which liberal constitutionalism purports to 
aspire.”523  
If United States territory is no longer static and cartographic but is 
more accurately described, according to Shachar, as a “complex, 
multilayered, and ever-transforming border, one that is drawn and 
redrawn, through the words of law and acts of regulatory agencies, to 
better [calibrate] the admitting state’s exclusion lines in response to new 
global changes,”524 then government will effectively be empowered to 
displace aliens more or less at will. This, however, is one instance in 
which the Framers were quite clear with regard to territory’s connection to 
domestic liberties. In at least some respects, the Framers themselves 
aspired to ethical territoriality.525  
The (re-)spatialization of domestic justice and liberty in this particular 
respect will require, at a minimum, a more robust judicial role in setting 
limits on immigration policy and enforcement. Like many immigration 
measures, the recent alterations to the country’s “legal border” are based in 
Congress’s plenary power over immigration.526 The plenary power 
doctrine largely immunizes federal immigration and naturalization 
measures from constitutional scrutiny. As T. Alexander Aleinikoff and 
others have argued, however, the doctrine of plenary power rests on a 
rather shaky foundation.527 The doctrine is based, at least in part, upon 
norms of deference to the political branches.528 Professor Aleinikoff casts 
serious doubt on the notion that the usual constitutional norms governing 
judicial avoidance of “political questions” support a plenary power over 
immigration.529 The malleability of the concept of “the border” provides 
one more reason for courts to more actively scrutinize immigration laws 
 
 
 522. Bosniak, supra note 55, at 392. 
 523. Id. at 392. 
 524. Shachar, supra note 16, at 193. 
 525. There were, of course, some instances in which the Framers fell far short of this aspiration—
slavery being the most obvious instance. 
 526. Chin, supra note 178. 
 527. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE 
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 151–81 (2002). 
 528. See id. at 154–59 (discussing institutional deference rationale). 
 529. See id. at 160 (discussing political question doctrine). 
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and policies. Given recent events, judicial skepticism with regard to 
agency territorial claims is certainly warranted. Again, the Bush 
administration simultaneously insisted on a static notion of territory in one 
context (detention of combatants), while relying on a far more dynamic 
and flexible approach in another (immigration). Basic notions of fairness 
dictate that courts inquire whether and, if so, under what circumstances, 
constitutional liberties expressly tied to territorial presence ought to be 
decoupled from expedient redefinitions of “the border.”  
As we have seen, the constitutional tools available for analyzing many 
domestic territorial displacements—the First Amendment, the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Equal 
Protection Clause, etc.—are often rather unsuited to the task. Thus, for 
example, the Constitution’s liberty provisions have been interpreted not to 
preclude a lifetime ban on a sex offender’s presence in certain public 
places, sex offender exclusion zones that require people to live in isolated 
areas, or a requirement that the destitute sleep in shelters rather than on the 
streets.530 Some relief has been granted those who wish to occupy local 
territory for specific purposes, such as speech or charitable association; as 
noted in Part III, in one extraordinary case day laborers prevailed under 
the Equal Protection Clause on a claim of official harassment.531 As noted 
below, constitutional structures such as federalism may provide another 
limited avenue for relief with respect to certain local displacements.  
One thing that is missing, by and large, from judicial and scholarly 
analyses of contemporary territorial displacements is recognition of certain 
implied spatial liberty interests. Recognition and enforcement of basic 
liberties like locomotion, public presence, and intrastate movement would 
help spatialize domestic liberty and narrow certain internal constitutional 
gaps. Most of us quite naturally take such basic liberties for granted. For 
those affected by the Geographies of Punishment, Purification, and 
Contagion, however, these liberties are either substantially diminished or, 
in some cases, denied altogether. 
Justice Douglas once referred to the basic right to locomotion—
walking, strolling, wandering, and loafing—as one of the Constitution’s 
“unwritten amenities.”532 Although Justice Douglas was speaking in 
particular of the exercise of First Amendment rights, the concept may be 
 
 
 530. See supra notes 340–74, 424–28 and accompanying text. 
 531. Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 532. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). See also City of Chicago v. 
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applied more broadly. Although the Constitution does not speak in explicit 
terms of the right to make basic choices regarding place or location, as 
explained earlier this amenity is indeed critical to full constitutional 
personhood. Measures that threaten immigrants with trespass citations for 
merely being in a particular place, exclude day laborers from parking lots 
and street corners, deny released sex offenders the liberty to move about in 
public, and cleanse or purify certain public areas of the homeless and 
destitute affect the spirit as well as the body. This is not to suggest that 
anyone has a right to be in or traverse a particular place without regard to 
public needs like safety or health. Territorial displacements ought to be 
enacted and reviewed, however, with the full breadth of their negative 
effects on personal independence, self-confidence, and dignity firmly in 
mind.  
One of the more glaring domestic spatial gaps in the Constitution 
relates to liberty of access to public places. Some of the territorial 
displacements discussed in this Article appear to be premised on the 
notion that there is no right to simply be present in public places. In one 
case, the Seventh Circuit expressly held that the right to be in a public 
park, even for wholly innocent purposes, is not “fundamental.”533 In 
another, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the destitute have no right to 
remain in public so long as the government has made shelter available for 
them.534 There is indeed nothing explicit in the text of the Constitution 
regarding the right to occupy public places or territories. This fact has 
occasionally given rise to the “libertarian fantasy”—a property regime in 
which all places are effectively privatized.535  
Putting aside any “unwritten amenities,” however, the Constitution’s 
text strongly suggests that this is indeed pure fantasy. The First 
Amendment guarantees to “the People” liberty to “peaceably assemble” 
and to “petition” government.536 This contemplates some public venue in 
which to assemble and from which to present grievances. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has stated that government holds quintessential public 
places like streets and parks “in trust” for the people.537 Expressly or 
implicitly privatizing all public places is incompatible with that trust 
arrangement. Finally, our history and traditions most certainly support a 
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general right to public presence. The American Revolution, the Civil 
Rights Movement, and countless other watershed events have taken place 
in public areas and territories—and in full public view.538 The right to be 
and remain in public places for legitimate, lawful purposes ought not to be 
narrowly limited to expressive exercises.539 Nor ought it to be deemed 
contingent upon the government failing to designate some other, more 
“suitable,” place to which the destitute or other marginalized persons must 
relocate.  
The liberty to move about within states and localities ought also to be 
considered one of the Constitution’s “unwritten amenities.” Americans are 
a mobile people, and local movement is critical to activities like pursuit of 
livelihood, intimate association, and even recreation. Again, recognition of 
such a liberty interest would not mean that a person has the right to go 
anyplace she wishes. It would, however, require that state and local 
officials justify territorial restrictions that deter migration. This might, in 
turn, deter some localities from enacting restrictive measures regarding 
matters like immigration and sex offender exclusion. It might also temper 
or limit the scope of contagion measures like quarantine. It makes no 
logical sense to deny a state the power to prohibit the movement of 
paupers or other unwanted populations across its borders,540 but to grant 
towns and counties that same basic authority. The Supreme Court ought to 
finally recognize a fundamental right to local migration. In the meantime, 
however, lower courts remain free to and ought to do so.  
Greater attention must also be given to the serious structural issues 
raised by certain local territorial displacements. For example, Wayne 
Logan has suggested that sex offender residency exclusion zones offend 
collectivist principles associated with the Dormant Commerce Clause.541 
As more jurisdictions essentially banish their own sex offenders, tens of 
thousands of individuals are likely to be forced to migrate elsewhere. 
Those displaced are likely to face similar residency restrictions in other 
states. If this trend continues, a segment of society may effectively be 
rendered “stateless.” As noted earlier, the Framers expressly demanded 
that territorial localism be submerged in favor of structural interests like 
 
 
 538. Public expressive activity, including mass political contention, from colonial times to the 
present is described in ZICK, supra note 42, at 25–64.  
 539. Public presence itself advances claims to identity, recognition, and communal belonging. See 
generally MITCHELL, supra note 394 (examining benefits to homeless of public presence). 
 540. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating state law impeding interstate 
travel of indigent persons). 
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national unity.542 In the likely event states and localities cannot be 
convinced to bend to collective interests, Congress (or the courts) must 
provide a remedy.543 Similar considerations apply with respect to the 
recent rash of local immigration measures, which are creating a patchwork 
of displacements across the United States. Undocumented aliens have no 
right to stay. Even if we are not prepared to welcome undocumented aliens 
into the national political community, however, a uniform solution to the 
matter is preferable to a system of local territorial defense measures and 
sanctuary cities. Insofar as territorial displacements affect such collective 
interests, we ought to look to the Constitution’s structural principles for 
political and judicial remedies.  
Finally, some concerted effort ought to be made to further incorporate 
territorial displacements into constitutional and political theories. For 
instance, displacement often creates castes of second-class citizens 
through territorial delegitimization. This was certainly clear with regard to 
antecedent displacements of African Americans and Japanese Americans. 
As Part III showed, however, today disfavored status applies to 
undocumented immigrants, sex offenders, and the homeless; it may also 
conceivably affect victims of certain pandemics. Through territory, certain 
persons are being rendered legal and societal “pariahs.”544  
As defined by Professors Farber and Sherry: “To be a pariah is to be 
shunned and isolated, to be treated as if one had a loathsome and 
contagious disease.”545 Farber and Sherry’s claim is that imposing 
“pariah” status on a person or group is a quintessential violation of 
constitutional equality. To be sure, Farber and Sherry state that the pariah 
principle is “at its strongest when the individuals so targeted are not 
responsible for their status.”546 But they also state that the principle “has 
force even where the individual bears some responsibility.”547 At least in 
its most extreme forms, constitutional displacement gives rise to the same 
fundamental concern at the heart of the pariah principle, namely the ability 
of those displaced to “participate in civil society.”548 Territoriality can 
make such participation extraordinarily burdensome or even impossible.  
Theories of social justice might also inform analysis of territorial and 
constitutional displacements. Each Geography of Displacement distributes 
 
 
 542. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
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rights to social and political participation through the good of territory. As 
Michael Walzer observed in Spheres of Justice, communities have a basic 
right to determine the rules and regulations of membership.549 Walzer 
noted, however, that in liberal societies this right must sometimes be 
constricted. In particular, liberalism requires that needy populations like 
the homeless not be entirely excluded.550 Even the sex offender, whatever 
else he has forfeited, has not waived membership and participation in civil 
society altogether or indefinitely. In more general terms, scholars and 
policymakers ought to consider the critical social justice implications of 
territorial and constitutional displacement.551  
In sum, we can improve constitutional analysis of domestic territorial 
restrictions by spatializing domestic liberty in various respects. 
Scrutinizing the government’s manipulation of the cartographic border 
may preserve explicit territorial liberties. Basic liberty interests in 
locomotion, presence, and intrastate movement ought also to be 
recognized. Limits on territorial displacement, including those that are 
implicit in the Constitution’s spatial framework, ought to be respected. 
Finally, as we think about the implications of territorial governance, we 
ought to incorporate displacement into constitutional, political, and social 
justice theories. These alterations will, of course, not prevent territorial or 
constitutional displacements from occurring. They are, however, important 
first steps for a liberal democracy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Locational and spatial liberties, including freedom of movement and 
choice of place, are so fundamental to dignity and personhood that most of 
us simply take them for granted. In the United States, national, state, and 
local territorial borders have taken on an increasingly illiberal character. 
Polities, communities, and persons are being defined and regulated with 
regard to various zones of legal, social, and political exclusion. 
Territoriality is being used by governments to punish, control, restrict, 
segregate, brand, demonize, and de-legalize certain persons and groups. 
The territorial and resulting constitutional displacements raise fundamental 
questions regarding the rule of law, membership in social and political 
communities, the limits of punishment, and concepts like constitutional 
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personhood and dignity. There are historical, social, political, and 
constitutional explanations for the increasing resort to territorial 
displacement. With regard to the last, this Article demonstrates that the 
Constitution’s own spatial framework contains troubling extra-territorial 
and intra-territorial gaps in protection for basic liberties. It highlights the 
critical intersection between territory and liberty, and urges more careful 
attention to the manner in which laws create and alter territorial borders. 
Respect for the rule of law, commitment to principles of liberal 
democracy, and concern for social justice all require that we work toward 
narrowing these spatial gaps.  
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